Ethiopian airline crash

Now being reported that the Lion aircraft experienced the same problem the day before it crashed but was saved by an experienced pilot who had cadged a lift on the plane and told the crew what to do. (Turn the bloody thing off).

Next day’s inexperienced crew didn’t have such a saviour.
 
As I understand it, they couldn't specify it as a potentially catastrophic failure requiring both AOA inputs active and with a disagree setting without acknowledging the aircraft being potentially unstable in normal flight and thus needing a whole boatload of additional pilot training and therefore expense. Yes?
I can’t go all the way on that one, because there are some very loaded legal and technical terms in there that go out on a limb (catastrophic, requiring, active, unstable, normal) that I do not know as fact.

Clearly, though, there are reasons why they did not require dual channel inputs, did not have a fail-safe system, why it was completely hidden from pilots (both in the OFFICIAL, LEGAL AFM and on flight deck displays) and they ALL point to not making the aircraft APPEAR TOO DIFFERENT, so as to APPARENTLY avoid the expenses you correctly assert.

Boeing are going to be prosecuted and sued for that. Obviously they've not deliberately sent out a potentially dangerous aircraft, but the short cuts to keep the cost down have killed people.
This reminds me very much of the Thales pitot-static system issue on the Airbus, but that was a known problem. Single inputs to the aircraft’s main flight data computers can make serious problems out of simple ones, because they are used in so many ways by the computers to make the aircraft “easier to fly.”

And, yes, Boeing and the FAA appear set for a circular firing squad in court. Boeing will say the FAA approved EVERYTHING, while the FAA will say Boeing DIDN’T TELL THEM everything.

These accidents could well make aircraft certification considerably more expensive and time-consuming in the future.

The more near-term expense is one of reputation, with potential lawsuits being eye-wateringly expensive, too. In the 1999 crash of a DC-10, the average payout to families who lost a loved one was about $4M, and that was for an accident that was a result of an invisible hairline fracture of a single turbine blade that cut through the only place where all 3, supposedly redundant, hydraulic systems met in the back of the aircraft. It was a million+ to one circumstance, at best, and could barely even be imagined. One assumes that the payouts for this kind of accident 20 years later, where there is already huge outcry over the short cuts taken, will be in the region of TEN FIGURES, if not 11!

I expect the lawsuits to go on for the rest of my 9.5 year airline career, and possibly beyond!
 
I can’t go all the way on that one, because there are some very loaded legal and technical terms in there that go out on a limb (catastrophic, requiring, active, unstable, normal) that I do not know as fact.

Clearly, though, there are reasons why they did not require dual channel inputs, did not have a fail-safe system, why it was completely hidden from pilots (both in the OFFICIAL, LEGAL AFM and on flight deck displays) and they ALL point to not making the aircraft APPEAR TOO DIFFERENT, so as to APPARENTLY avoid the expenses you correctly assert.


This reminds me very much of the Thales pitot-static system issue on the Airbus, but that was a known problem. Single inputs to the aircraft’s main flight data computers can make serious problems out of simple ones, because they are used in so many ways by the computers to make the aircraft “easier to fly.”

And, yes, Boeing and the FAA appear set for a circular firing squad in court. Boeing will say the FAA approved EVERYTHING, while the FAA will say Boeing DIDN’T TELL THEM everything.

These accidents could well make aircraft certification considerably more expensive and time-consuming in the future.

The more near-term expense is one of reputation, with potential lawsuits being eye-wateringly expensive, too. In the 1999 crash of a DC-10, the average payout to families who lost a loved one was about $4M, and that was for an accident that was a result of an invisible hairline fracture of a single turbine blade that cut through the only place where all 3, supposedly redundant, hydraulic systems met in the back of the aircraft. It was a million+ to one circumstance, at best, and could barely even be imagined. One assumes that the payouts for this kind of accident 20 years later, where there is already huge outcry over the short cuts taken, will be in the region of TEN FIGURES, if not 11!

I expect the lawsuits to go on for the rest of my 9.5 year airline career, and possibly beyond!

The big crux of the situation is, can Boeing disprove that part of the safety certification criteria (CS25-1509) which is "No single failure should be attributable to a Hazardous or above (Catastrophic) failure". that this accident is found as the root cause. ie, the AoA vain failure (singular) did not have the correct level of redundancy or safety features to prevent the loss of the aircraft.

The cross check and alert of mismatch data from the AoA is only an "Optional extra" SAFETY feature on the Max, thus rendering the pilots unaware that a safety system "MCAS" is in action to correct the A/C handling due to bad data error it recieves from the faulty AoA.

The lack of training for the crew how to deal with a runaway MCAS

The understated declaration of the rate of pitch down change the MCAS performs to the FAA to prevent full certification qualification is unforgivable and potentially criminal in itself.

This is where Grandfather certification rules need to be very closely reviewed for future updates to old airframe designs.
 
The big crux of the situation is, can Boeing disprove that part of the safety certification criteria (CS25-1509) which is "No single failure should be attributable to a Hazardous or above (Catastrophic) failure". that this accident is found as the root cause. ie, the AoA vain failure (singular) did not have the correct level of redundancy or safety features to prevent the loss of the aircraft.

The cross check and alert of mismatch data from the AoA is only an "Optional extra" SAFETY feature on the Max, thus rendering the pilots unaware that a safety system "MCAS" is in action to correct the A/C handling due to bad data error it recieves from the faulty AoA.

The lack of training for the crew how to deal with a runaway MCAS

The understated declaration of the rate of pitch down change the MCAS performs to the FAA to prevent full certification qualification is unforgivable and potentially criminal in itself.

This is where Grandfather certification rules need to be very closely reviewed for future updates to old airframe designs.
EXCELLENT post.

As I alluded to, and you fleshed our, the words “hazardous” and “catastrophic” have specific legal and certificates meanings. Therein lies a zero or two on damages, as does the misrepresented trim limit (not rate) and its cumulative (additive) effect, which is (IIRC) unheard of in aviation.

Whether the cumulative effect of MCAS was even known by Boeing, we have yet to see, but highly doubt it!

Not a good situation all around and this entire series of events (design, same type, financial imperatives, self-certification) is an indictment of the unfettered capitalism that has taken shape recently. The amounts of money to be made are eye watering when you have a 9 figure aircraft and a 3000 aircraft order book, but these little “Easter eggs” are insidiously dangerous.

While the loss of life is extremely sad, and an indictment of the current regulatory process, it may have saved an even bigger problem in the future had this system remained hidden to airlines and pilots alike until those 3000 aircraft came online as the narrow body mainstay of many global airlines.

There are significant lessons to be learned from this experience. Whether they are learned, and, more importantly, acted upon, may be left to the regulatory oversight agencies that failed in the first place. Had either of these crashes occurred in the US, I can’t imagine the level of the shitstorm that would be underway now, but it would make this rather large one pale in comparison!
 
EXCELLENT post.

As I alluded to, and you fleshed our, the words “hazardous” and “catastrophic” have specific legal and certificates meanings. Therein lies a zero or two on damages, as does the misrepresented trim limit (not rate) and its cumulative (additive) effect, which is (IIRC) unheard of in aviation.

Whether the cumulative effect of MCAS was even known by Boeing, we have yet to see, but highly doubt it!

Not a good situation all around and this entire series of events (design, same type, financial imperatives, self-certification) is an indictment of the unfettered capitalism that has taken shape recently. The amounts of money to be made are eye watering when you have a 9 figure aircraft and a 3000 aircraft order book, but these little “Easter eggs” are insidiously dangerous.

While the loss of life is extremely sad, and an indictment of the current regulatory process, it may have saved an even bigger problem in the future had this system remained hidden to airlines and pilots alike until those 3000 aircraft came online as the narrow body mainstay of many global airlines.

There are significant lessons to be learned from this experience. Whether they are learned, and, more importantly, acted upon, may be left to the regulatory oversight agencies that failed in the first place. Had either of these crashes occurred in the US, I can’t imagine the level of the shitstorm that would be underway now, but it would make this rather large one pale in comparison!
Meanwhile in the US your imbecile President is doing his best to remove as many regulations as possible so that business can make more money. He will undoubtedly not have the mental capacity to realise that a significant factor in accidents such as these is regulations that are not stringent enough, and will continue to boast about cutting regulations in spite of the potential consequences. Not saying this one is Trump's fault but part of the blame falls into his mantra of deregulation at any cost.
 
Meanwhile in the US your imbecile President is doing his best to remove as many regulations as possible so that business can make more money. He will undoubtedly not have the mental capacity to realise that a significant factor in accidents such as these is regulations that are not stringent enough, and will continue to boast about cutting regulations in spite of the potential consequences. Not saying this one is Trump's fault but part of the blame falls into his mantra of deregulation at any cost.

Don’t diss the Donald.
 
Meanwhile in the US your imbecile President is doing his best to remove as many regulations as possible so that business can make more money. He will undoubtedly not have the mental capacity to realise that a significant factor in accidents such as these is regulations that are not stringent enough, and will continue to boast about cutting regulations in spite of the potential consequences. Not saying this one is Trump's fault but part of the blame falls into his mantra of deregulation at any cost.
Yup!

Interesting how he is trying to take credit for grounding the fleet! Never misses an opportunity to try to self-aggrandize.
 

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