To build on my previous post about how Lord Pannick’s playbook is designed to dismantle this whole process, I looked into the verdict to see how the PL’s "sham" theory actually translates into specific rule violations. Again, I am no legal expert and this is purely my own reading of the text, but looking closely at the rules cuts straight to a fundamental distinction the panel completely blurred: there is a massive difference between a compliant workaround and breaking the rules.
Even taking the PL’s "disguised funding" allegations entirely at face value, provided a separate legal entity signed a genuine commercial contract and paid the club, it did not matter under the rules at the time where a sponsor’s upstream capital came from. Between 2009 and 2018, there were no APT rules, no PL FMV tests, and no clause in the PL Handbook prohibiting a club owner from investing in or providing liquidity to a third-party company that later sponsored the club.
As I understand English commercial law, structuring your affairs to navigate around the literal text of a rulebook isn't cheating; it is a valid workaround. We saw the exact same principle when Chelsea sold hotels and their women's team to sister companies to satisfy profit rules. Both cases involved corporate structuring that complied with the handbook as written because explicit bans did not exist yet. Crucially, the PL never weaponised "good faith" against Chelsea, recognising that broad catch-alls cannot ban clever financial navigation after the fact. Indeed, the PL’s subsequent introduction of sweeping APT rules is the clearest proof these structures were permissible at the time, you don't pass new laws to ban something already illegal.
Because no rule actually prohibited upstream funding, the panel had to stretch three broad governance clauses to manufacture a breach:
Rule E.3: True and Fair View
They used E.3 to claim the sponsorships were disguised equity. Yet under English company law, Etihad and City were distinct corporate entities. Etihad paid every invoice from its own treasury, booked 100 per cent of the costs, and received 100 per cent of the contracted branding. Recording that as commercial revenue wasn't false accounting; it was the only legally accurate way to record a binding contract between two separate companies, regardless of where Etihad's funding came from. The accounts showed a true and fair view, so there was no rule breach.
Rule E.49: Related-Party Disclosures
Under UK accounting standards at the time, "related party" had a strict legal definition based on direct or joint corporate control, not regional proximity. Because City was owned by Sheikh Mansour’s private vehicle (ADUG) while Etihad was a state-owned enterprise, there was no common legal control, which is why top-tier auditors repeatedly signed off on our accounts without flagging Etihad. The panel only triggered E.49 by casually collapsing separate sovereign and private entities into a single wallet, bypassing basic company law. Without common control, there was no disclosure obligation, and again, no rule breach.
Rule B.15: Good Faith
With neither E.3 nor E.49 prohibiting upstream funding, they fell back on B.15’s woolly good-faith catch-all. Yet under UK contract law, a vague good-faith clause cannot be used to rewrite a contract or invent technical financial restrictions the drafters omitted.
Looking at the broader timeline, the irony is stark. While the panel accused the club of constructing retrospective justifications, applying modern anti-avoidance standards to police 2011 commercial contracts is the very definition of hindsight regulation, "concocted after the fact". Commercial certainty under English law depends on parties being able to rely on the rules in force when a contract is signed, not on how a tribunal wishes those rules had been drafted a decade later.
This is where I think Lord Pannick ties the strategy together. While secondary charges will still rely on wider procedural defences, on the main sponsorship charges he doesn't even need to worry about missing appendices or re-run a forty-day factual trial. For the appeal, and any wider legal challenges beyond sports arbitration, his task is structural: persuading the Appeal Board that a private tribunal cannot stretch vague clauses to retroactively punish a workaround that complied with the rulebook as written. If an institution can weaponise "good faith" to penalise conduct it forgot to outlaw a decade ago, rules cease to offer any legal certainty at all, an argument built precisely for a constitutional heavy-hitter.