Read in Private Eye a few years ago, that Keegan and a few other managers had shares in a certain player agency and were buying players from that agency with no real regards to current form or fitness. Keegan, alledgedly was one of the worst offenders and it's either the McPointy transfer or the Fowler or both that were purely down to that player being at the particular agency, I think it was Proactive, which wouldl also make more sense of Newcastle seeling Cole to United whilst Keegan was manager there. Not that there is anything in that of course, just pure speculation on my part, but Private Eye ran a few pieces on it.
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Bernstein/Keegan Split
- Thread starter Citizen Green
- Start date
blue b4 the moon
Well-Known Member
Met him at an open day at Maine Road...thanked him for making us relevant again. He was a really nice fella.
Prestwich_Blue
Well-Known Member
I've just read the Football Leaks book (prior to the City leaks) and Peter Kenyon had a company that took shares in players. I think he had 10% of Sergio.Read in Private Eye a few years ago, that Keegan and a few other managers had shares in a certain player agency and were buying players from that agency with no real regards to current form or fitness. Keegan, alledgedly was one of the worst offenders and it's either the McPointy transfer or the Fowler or both that were purely down to that player being at the particular agency, I think it was Proactive, which wouldl also make more sense of Newcastle seeling Cole to United whilst Keegan was manager there. Not that there is anything in that of course, just pure speculation on my part, but Private Eye ran a few pieces on it.
I've just read the Football Leaks book (prior to the City leaks) and Peter Kenyon had a company that took shares in players. I think he had 10% of Sergio.
Nothing would suprise me about oily Kenyon.
The business, done by Keegan and a few others was pushing the share price up, making them a tidy profit, allegedly.
Blue Feather
Well-Known Member
- Joined
- 10 May 2013
- Messages
- 1,489
Distin was a great signing. Never wanted Fowler, would have liked us to test the water with Defoe, maybe unlikely to come at the time but who knows? Was quite excited about McManaman coming in on a 'free' until his second game...….
Irish Blue82
Active Member
- Joined
- 4 Apr 2020
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- 38
- Team supported
- Man City
I remember thinking the same. I naively thought we might go placesI remember thinking ‘wow’ that we’d have Anelka and Fowler up front.
Anelka agreed to rejoin us when Sven was manager before Chelsea came in for him.
Would love to have seen how we would of paid for him!
Anelka actually originally turned Chelsea down and would have signed for us under Sven in the January 2008 transfer window, because he preferred the idea of being our number one striker to that of being Drogba's understudy at Stamford Bridge. Thaksin was proposing to inject funds by way of a shareholder loan to foot the bill, but then political developments in Thailand intervened. I'll post about that in the Thaksin thread, but in the meantime, below is what I have to say on Keegan and Bernstein, the actual topic of this thread.
* * *
The roots of the falling out between Keegan and Bernstein lay in the agreement reached with the former to become our manager back in 2001. Keegan wouldn't have joined the club without the promise of big-money backing, so they agreed a budget that allowed us to basically keep Joe Royle's PL team together and to make the odd addition with a view to putting out a side that would be very strong by second-tier standards. Shareholder loans from Makin and Wardle were instrumental in the club being able to keep players bought for the previous top-flight campaign such as Dunne, Howey, Huckerby and Wanchope. Otherwise, the wage bill would simply have been unsustainable given the drop in income after relegation (we posted a loss of around £6 million on a turnover in the region of £24 million for the 2001/2 promotion season).
The backdrop to this was the then-forthcoming move to the Commonwealth Games stadium in 2003. KK's remit from the City board was to ensure that we approached the relocation as a Premier League club with a team that would excite the fanbase and thus enable us to regularly sell out the 44,000 seats for home fans at the new venue. In return, he was given the rather nebulous promise that, should he achieve promotion, sufficient funds would be made available for him to achieve the second part of the assignment. At the time the promise in question was made, the intention was that the club would attract additional external investment (probably via a flotation) when promoted. After all, we were historically one of English football's best-supported clubs and were about to move to a new stadium, secured on highly advantageous terms and conditions, with a charismatic manager who had an excellent track record at club level. Even with the benefit of hindsight, I find that a reasonable strategy.
Unfortunately, it didn't work out. During 2001/2, the financial climate in the football industry changed appreciably for reasons that were largely unforeseeable and, by the summer of 2002, it wasn't possible to secure investment on reasonable terms with the ease that seemed likely a year previously. Nonetheless, the board at City recognised that they had to back the manager in the circumstances so they did deals to bring Distin and Anelka for considerable fees, while free transfer Schmeichel and the on-loan Foe commanded big wages. There were also ultimately unsuccessful punts on a few less established players. Any transfer expenditure had to be funded by borrowing: we had to assume loan debt to fit out the new stadium, but topped up these loans to give KK what he regarded as an acceptable transfer budget.
While we struggled early on in that 2002/3 campaign, by January we were in the top half of the table and relegation wasn't a serious possibility unless we absolutely imploded in the latter phase of the season. So this is where we found ourselves when Keegan and Bernstein were trying to map out a transfer strategy for the January 2003 window (transfer windows being a new development that year). Bernstein wanted to adopt a conservative approach. We'd already taken what he regarded as a "calculated gamble" to afford Keegan the purchasing power to bring in four top-class recruits in the summer, but he wasn't in favour of borrowing heaps more cash for further reinforcements - whereas his manager was.
The Fowler deal merely brought to a head matters that had been brewing over the previous three months or so. Bernstein was suspicious of the player's injury record, but also recognised that the board couldn't really dictate the manager's transfer purchases. However, he believed that Leeds, who were then in truly desperate financial straits, would sell the player for a guaranteed fee of £2 million, plus relatively modest incentive-based payments. Keegan pre-empted him and agreed a fee of £4.5 million plus £3 million in add-ons. Bernstein moved to renegotiate, whereupon Fowler pulled out of the deal because he thought this a signal that the City board didn't really want him. In the end, a deal was done at £3 million plus £500,000 for every 15 first-team appearances up to 90 (i.e. a maximum of a further £3 million).
However, the episode almost saw Keegan walk out on the club. He tendered his resignation on the Friday morning when we were due to play Newcastle away the next day (the match where Shearer scored after about ten seconds). Dennis Tueart talked him out of it, meaning that the MEN, I'm told, had to pull a 'Keegan quits' special they were preparing for that afternoon. But the episode cost us the services of Bernstein. He never owned more than 1% of the club and was always a hired hand. He was in post because he had a demonstrable track record of providing valuable strategic input to public companies. But if your major shareholders in a situation such as this ignore your advice, then why would you stay? Ultimately, Wardle and Makin, who had the largest stake in the club, went against Bernstein on a fundamental matter of future strategy so it was entirely unsurprising that he walked.
Keegan had promised Wardle and Makin that, if given the right financial backing, he'd build a side that would generate cash by drawing big crowds and progressing to the latter stages of cup competitions. Unfortunately, he didn't deliver. His recruits in January 2003 and the summer of the same year encompassed many big names - Fowler, Bosvelt, Tarnat, Seaman, Sinclair, McManaman and the like. Had he brought that group of players together in 1997, they might have seriously challenged for silverware. Unfortunately, in 2003, they severely stretched the club's finances but without delivering that level of performance.
goatersnipple
Well-Known Member
I always thought something was going on when he used to bring that pointless pointing scouse bastard on for the last 5 minutes in a gameRead in Private Eye a few years ago, that Keegan and a few other managers had shares in a certain player agency and were buying players from that agency with no real regards to current form or fitness. Keegan, alledgedly was one of the worst offenders and it's either the McPointy transfer or the Fowler or both that were purely down to that player being at the particular agency, I think it was Proactive, which wouldl also make more sense of Newcastle seeling Cole to United whilst Keegan was manager there. Not that there is anything in that of course, just pure speculation on my part, but Private Eye ran a few pieces on it.
* * *
The roots of the falling out between Keegan and Bernstein lay in the agreement reached with the former to become our manager back in 2001. Keegan wouldn't have joined the club without the promise of big-money backing, so they agreed a budget that allowed us to basically keep Joe Royle's PL team together and to make the odd addition with a view to putting out a side that would be very strong by second-tier standards. Shareholder loans from Makin and Wardle were instrumental in the club being able to keep players bought for the previous top-flight campaign such as Dunne, Howey, Huckerby and Wanchope. Otherwise, the wage bill would simply have been unsustainable given the drop in income after relegation (we posted a loss of around £6 million on a turnover in the region of £24 million for the 2001/2 promotion season).
The backdrop to this was the then-forthcoming move to the Commonwealth Games stadium in 2003. KK's remit from the City board was to ensure that we approached the relocation as a Premier League club with a team that would excite the fanbase and thus enable us to regularly sell out the 44,000 seats for home fans at the new venue. In return, he was given the rather nebulous promise that, should he achieve promotion, sufficient funds would be made available for him to achieve the second part of the assignment. At the time the promise in question was made, the intention was that the club would attract additional external investment (probably via a flotation) when promoted. After all, we were historically one of English football's best-supported clubs and were about to move to a new stadium, secured on highly advantageous terms and conditions, with a charismatic manager who had an excellent track record at club level. Even with the benefit of hindsight, I find that a reasonable strategy.
Unfortunately, it didn't work out. During 2001/2, the financial climate in the football industry changed appreciably for reasons that were largely unforeseeable and, by the summer of 2002, it wasn't possible to secure investment on reasonable terms with the ease that seemed likely a year previously. Nonetheless, the board at City recognised that they had to back the manager in the circumstances so they did deals to bring Distin and Anelka for considerable fees, while free transfer Schmeichel and the on-loan Foe commanded big wages. There were also ultimately unsuccessful punts on a few less established players. Any transfer expenditure had to be funded by borrowing: we had to assume loan debt to fit out the new stadium, but topped up these loans to give KK what he regarded as an acceptable transfer budget.
While we struggled early on in that 2002/3 campaign, by January we were in the top half of the table and relegation wasn't a serious possibility unless we absolutely imploded in the latter phase of the season. So this is where we found ourselves when Keegan and Bernstein were trying to map out a transfer strategy for the January 2003 window (transfer windows being a new development that year). Bernstein wanted to adopt a conservative approach. We'd already taken what he regarded as a "calculated gamble" to afford Keegan the purchasing power to bring in four top-class recruits in the summer, but he wasn't in favour of borrowing heaps more cash for further reinforcements - whereas his manager was.
The Fowler deal merely brought to a head matters that had been brewing over the previous three months or so. Bernstein was suspicious of the player's injury record, but also recognised that the board couldn't really dictate the manager's transfer purchases. However, he believed that Leeds, who were then in truly desperate financial straits, would sell the player for a guaranteed fee of £2 million, plus relatively modest incentive-based payments. Keegan pre-empted him and agreed a fee of £4.5 million plus £3 million in add-ons. Bernstein moved to renegotiate, whereupon Fowler pulled out of the deal because he thought this a signal that the City board didn't really want him. In the end, a deal was done at £3 million plus £500,000 for every 15 first-team appearances up to 90 (i.e. a maximum of a further £3 million).
However, the episode almost saw Keegan walk out on the club. He tendered his resignation on the Friday morning when we were due to play Newcastle away the next day (the match where Shearer scored after about ten seconds). Dennis Tueart talked him out of it, meaning that the MEN, I'm told, had to pull a 'Keegan quits' special they were preparing for that afternoon. But the episode cost us the services of Bernstein. He never owned more than 1% of the club and was always a hired hand. He was in post because he had a demonstrable track record of providing valuable strategic input to public companies. But if your major shareholders in a situation such as this ignore your advice, then why would you stay? Ultimately, Wardle and Makin, who had the largest stake in the club, went against Bernstein on a fundamental matter of future strategy so it was entirely unsurprising that he walked.
Keegan had promised Wardle and Makin that, if given the right financial backing, he'd build a side that would generate cash by drawing big crowds and progressing to the latter stages of cup competitions. Unfortunately, he didn't deliver. His recruits in January 2003 and the summer of the same year encompassed many big names - Fowler, Bosvelt, Tarnat, Seaman, Sinclair, McManaman and the like. Had he brought that group of players together in 1997, they might have seriously challenged for silverware. Unfortunately, in 2003, they severely stretched the club's finances but without delivering that level of performance.[/QUOTE]
Brilliant insight this thanks. I find these insider bits of information about the workings of football in general fascinating, but even more so when it relates to City.
The roots of the falling out between Keegan and Bernstein lay in the agreement reached with the former to become our manager back in 2001. Keegan wouldn't have joined the club without the promise of big-money backing, so they agreed a budget that allowed us to basically keep Joe Royle's PL team together and to make the odd addition with a view to putting out a side that would be very strong by second-tier standards. Shareholder loans from Makin and Wardle were instrumental in the club being able to keep players bought for the previous top-flight campaign such as Dunne, Howey, Huckerby and Wanchope. Otherwise, the wage bill would simply have been unsustainable given the drop in income after relegation (we posted a loss of around £6 million on a turnover in the region of £24 million for the 2001/2 promotion season).
The backdrop to this was the then-forthcoming move to the Commonwealth Games stadium in 2003. KK's remit from the City board was to ensure that we approached the relocation as a Premier League club with a team that would excite the fanbase and thus enable us to regularly sell out the 44,000 seats for home fans at the new venue. In return, he was given the rather nebulous promise that, should he achieve promotion, sufficient funds would be made available for him to achieve the second part of the assignment. At the time the promise in question was made, the intention was that the club would attract additional external investment (probably via a flotation) when promoted. After all, we were historically one of English football's best-supported clubs and were about to move to a new stadium, secured on highly advantageous terms and conditions, with a charismatic manager who had an excellent track record at club level. Even with the benefit of hindsight, I find that a reasonable strategy.
Unfortunately, it didn't work out. During 2001/2, the financial climate in the football industry changed appreciably for reasons that were largely unforeseeable and, by the summer of 2002, it wasn't possible to secure investment on reasonable terms with the ease that seemed likely a year previously. Nonetheless, the board at City recognised that they had to back the manager in the circumstances so they did deals to bring Distin and Anelka for considerable fees, while free transfer Schmeichel and the on-loan Foe commanded big wages. There were also ultimately unsuccessful punts on a few less established players. Any transfer expenditure had to be funded by borrowing: we had to assume loan debt to fit out the new stadium, but topped up these loans to give KK what he regarded as an acceptable transfer budget.
While we struggled early on in that 2002/3 campaign, by January we were in the top half of the table and relegation wasn't a serious possibility unless we absolutely imploded in the latter phase of the season. So this is where we found ourselves when Keegan and Bernstein were trying to map out a transfer strategy for the January 2003 window (transfer windows being a new development that year). Bernstein wanted to adopt a conservative approach. We'd already taken what he regarded as a "calculated gamble" to afford Keegan the purchasing power to bring in four top-class recruits in the summer, but he wasn't in favour of borrowing heaps more cash for further reinforcements - whereas his manager was.
The Fowler deal merely brought to a head matters that had been brewing over the previous three months or so. Bernstein was suspicious of the player's injury record, but also recognised that the board couldn't really dictate the manager's transfer purchases. However, he believed that Leeds, who were then in truly desperate financial straits, would sell the player for a guaranteed fee of £2 million, plus relatively modest incentive-based payments. Keegan pre-empted him and agreed a fee of £4.5 million plus £3 million in add-ons. Bernstein moved to renegotiate, whereupon Fowler pulled out of the deal because he thought this a signal that the City board didn't really want him. In the end, a deal was done at £3 million plus £500,000 for every 15 first-team appearances up to 90 (i.e. a maximum of a further £3 million).
However, the episode almost saw Keegan walk out on the club. He tendered his resignation on the Friday morning when we were due to play Newcastle away the next day (the match where Shearer scored after about ten seconds). Dennis Tueart talked him out of it, meaning that the MEN, I'm told, had to pull a 'Keegan quits' special they were preparing for that afternoon. But the episode cost us the services of Bernstein. He never owned more than 1% of the club and was always a hired hand. He was in post because he had a demonstrable track record of providing valuable strategic input to public companies. But if your major shareholders in a situation such as this ignore your advice, then why would you stay? Ultimately, Wardle and Makin, who had the largest stake in the club, went against Bernstein on a fundamental matter of future strategy so it was entirely unsurprising that he walked.
Keegan had promised Wardle and Makin that, if given the right financial backing, he'd build a side that would generate cash by drawing big crowds and progressing to the latter stages of cup competitions. Unfortunately, he didn't deliver. His recruits in January 2003 and the summer of the same year encompassed many big names - Fowler, Bosvelt, Tarnat, Seaman, Sinclair, McManaman and the like. Had he brought that group of players together in 1997, they might have seriously challenged for silverware. Unfortunately, in 2003, they severely stretched the club's finances but without delivering that level of performance.[/QUOTE]
Brilliant insight this thanks. I find these insider bits of information about the workings of football in general fascinating, but even more so when it relates to City.
Read in Private Eye a few years ago, that Keegan and a few other managers had shares in a certain player agency and were buying players from that agency with no real regards to current form or fitness. Keegan, alledgedly was one of the worst offenders and it's either the McPointy transfer or the Fowler or both that were purely down to that player being at the particular agency, I think it was Proactive, which wouldl also make more sense of Newcastle seeling Cole to United whilst Keegan was manager there. Not that there is anything in that of course, just pure speculation on my part, but Private Eye ran a few pieces on it.
Both were seen as good signings at the time, just over £3m down for Fowler and the rest on performance and McM on a free.
Both were on a lot less wages at City than their previous club, although Fowler was paid his full Leeds' wage for the length of the previous contract topped up by Leeds who were desperate at the time.