Trident

[Wilf Wild 1937]

Targetting does not have dependency on US infrastructure.

Missiles do not go back to the US for routine maintenace, this is undertaken in the UK so their effectiveness is assured .

Thanks for that, that's reassuring.

My understanding had been that on board targeting was the fallback position and not the default. I also thought that all maintenance was undertaken in Georgia.

At times it's difficult to get the true picture given the number of inaccurate articles in the press; many of which paint a false picture due to the anti Trident stance of the publication.

I'm not quite sure why there is such sentiment in the UK. I've never been aware of similar feelings in France. Maybe four years of occupation has made them more aware of what can go wrong if you don't pose a credible threat to any potential enemy?

 

[Gelsons Dad]

The command structure is in the public domain.

The boats and missiles are integrated into the NATO command structure. Any instructions to fire come from the US Joint Chiefs via the US President into SACEUR.

SACEUR is always a 4-star US General or Admiral and is, by default, CinC US Eastern Command. If the decision to fire is taken, SACEUR issues the order which then has to be authorised by the PM and passed to Northwood. So I'll accept that, at that point, it's all in our control.

SACEUR also issue targets as the missiles aren't pre-targeted as I understand it and therefore have to be targeted on-the-fly depending on NATO requirements. I suppose the PM could refuse to issue the order so in that sense we could have independent freedom of action.

What difference withholding our maximum 40 warheads would make if there was a general conflagration is open to debate mind you but is probably akin to one member of a 20-man firing squad refusing to pull the trigger. However as someone said, it wouldn't make a blind bit of difference as the victims wouldn't know who had actually fired so we'd get it anyway, if we hadn't already.

But in a situation where we're acting outside of NATO control the line becomes blurred. As part of the original agreement to lease Polaris, as I said earlier, there was a clause that the UK could act unilaterally only if "there was a threat to the supreme national interest" but no one ever really defined that and it seems like it was a typically ambiguous diplomatic device that in effect was meaningless. Fortunately it's never been tested.

The command structure I was referring to is the UK not NATO command structure.

 

[inbetween]

I'm sure, but the REAL thing is a very different matter.
Really REALLY knowing it's for real, and doubting what your systems are saying is natural. Not to mention the hesitation in truly activating. There must be all sorts of procedures is the PM freaks out and isn't up to deciding etc. Shame none of us would be around to study the behaviour!

I mean Theresa May, or any PM would undergo the rehearsal many times, but the one time it's real, they could do something completely different than ever before. Someone will have planned for that happening I expect, but you won't hear that mention in PMQ's !

That is like saying though if a plane and it's pilots encounter a once in a career engine failure then suddenly the pilots might not know how to deal with it. It is primarily the rigorous training which kicks in and pulls you through no matter how you are feeling when it happens. I would imagine if something like this happened you are trained to deal with it and that is all you will ever need.

Don't forget these are nuclear armed submarines and the entire training and command structure is built around the very real prospect of potentially launching nuclear weapons, they do not exist for any other reason.

 

[FanchesterCity]

That is like saying though if a plane and it's pilots encounter a once in a career engine failure then suddenly the pilots might not know how to deal with it. It is primarily the rigorous training which kicks in and pulls you through no matter how you are feeling when it happens. I would imagine if something like this happened you are trained to deal with it and that is all you will ever need.

Don't forget these are nuclear armed submarines and the entire training and command structure is built around the very real prospect of potentially launching nuclear weapons, they do not exist for any other reason.

The PM isn't doing this week in week out, that's the point. Although she might very well be briefed and have a rehearsal quite frequently, it's just not the real thing, and it's really not a day in / day out activity. When the actual moment comes, there simply is no telling how someone would react. Even further down the chain, until the moment comes we will never be 100% sure - just as sure as we can be.

Put it another way - you can train for penalties all day long, and be one of the greatest footballers ever - but at the moment when it really counts - stuff happens.

 

[mosssideblue]

The PM isn't doing this week in week out, that's the point. Although she might very well be briefed and have a rehearsal quite frequently, it's just not the real thing, and it's really not a day in / day out activity. When the actual moment comes, there simply is no telling how someone would react. Even further down the chain, until the moment comes we will never be 100% sure - just as sure as we can be.

Put it another way - you can train for penalties all day long, and be one of the greatest footballers ever - but at the moment when it really counts - stuff happens.

To compare practicing penalties with practicing a nuclear scenario confirms your lack of appreciation to the level of detail that is considered, including fall back and what if scenarios in the training and practicing for launch operations. I take your point that in general, when an emergency occurs, peoples behaviours change, but from my experience, not "these people".

 

[SWP's back]

If it was in the America's interest then yes. In July 1940 we attacked the French fleet sinking one battleship and damaging 5 others and killing over a 1,000 French sailors. This happened despite receiving assurances that the ships would be scuttled from the commander of the French navy. A hard decision was taken by the British in a time of crisis. Do you think the Americans would be less inclined to take a hard decision in a time of crisis if they judged, as we did, that it was in their best interests?

Whilst the US remains the dominant military and political partner in the US/UK relationship a scenario where we fire the Trident system without American consent is just not credible. To fire (or seek to fire) the system against American advice to desist would put us in at odds or even in conflict with the US. The last time we were at odds with the US was Suez. Eisenhower warned Britain not to invade and threatened us when we did. This led to a humiliating climb down and our foreign policy has been largely subordinate to the US ever since. We initiated the Suez action with sovereign forces under our command and ended up bowing to US pressure yet you think we can initiate the firing of a missile system leased from the US without US consent or approval? No chance.

Just like we bowed to US pressure over the Falklands.

 

[BobKowalski]

Just like we bowed to US pressure over the Falklands.

The Americans always had our backs. Ronnie even wrote a note to Madge stating 'we will do what we can to assist you here'. The US concerns were a) the UK losing and Thatcher getting the boot or b) it becoming a drawn out conflict and the Soviets sticking their nose in. Basically the US had little confidence in the UK winning the conflict which is why they pushed hard for a diplomatic resolution. In this effort they had the support of Foreign Sercretary Pym who also wanted to avoid military conflict.

During the conflict the US provided covert support particularly satellite intelligence.

 

[FanchesterCity]

To compare practicing penalties with practicing a nuclear scenario confirms your lack of appreciation to the level of detail that is considered, including fall back and what if scenarios in the training and practicing for launch operations. I take your point that in general, when an emergency occurs, peoples behaviours change, but from my experience, not "these people".

It's far from a lack of appreciation, it's accepting that real world situations bring up surprises that no training exercise can simulate.
At the very top of the tree (in theory) is a Prime Minister who often is in place for only a few years. There is no way on earth you can vouch for their ability to deal with the stress of a nuclear attack, or how they might behave. No way on earth. They could actually be in place only a matter of days - depending on when the attack happened. There's no selection process for an appropriate PM to be commander in chief.

That's why I said there has to be a strategy in place for a PM who isn't decapitated, but panics / can't decide.

 

[Hamann Pineapple]

To compare practicing penalties with practicing a nuclear scenario confirms your lack of appreciation to the level of detail that is considered, including fall back and what if scenarios in the training and practicing for launch operations. I take your point that in general, when an emergency occurs, peoples behaviours change, but from my experience, not "these people".

Hasn't one of our nuclear subs just hit a merchant ship off Gibraltar ?

 

[inbetween]

Hasn't one of our nuclear subs just hit a merchant ship off Gibraltar ?

No, that was an Astute nuclear powered submarine not a Vanguard nuclear armed submarine.