Now - I have already said quite a few times recently that I do not want the implosion to happen anytime soon - the longer it is delayed and the more distance we can put/preparations we can make the better we will be able to ride the storm when it does collapse/implode - but that outcome is now and has been for some time, inevitable.
As I mentioned in an earlier post - people - like Sinn - were drawing attention to this issue around 2011, in fact I said......
"I have recently found some other clips about this issue that are from years before the ones I posted - and it was described as something that could 'become' something to worry about if not addressed. Subsequently, it has not been addressed and therefore...………"
The paper you linked - if I have downloaded the correct one - covers this on page 30.....
Please check out that this is the document you meant - I found it as a download after following the link you posted
https://www.cass.city.ac.uk/__data/...748/target-2-bailout-system-euro-afloatv1.pdf
"......It was the German academic Hans-Werner Sinn101 who first discovered what was going on in early 2011 by examining the central banks’ balance sheets. He found that Target2 was far more than a simple payments system. It had become intimately involved with the emergence of systematic balance of payments surpluses and deficits amongst the Eurozone member states, with shifting the refinancing of commercial bank credit from the central banks of states with weak economies to the central banks of states with strong economies, and with facilitating cross-border private sector capital movements away from states with financially weak banks, such as those in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, to the stronger core banks.
The evidence for this was that the increase in Target2 liabilities of a member state equalled the sum of the current account deficit and net capital outflows (as equation (2) above shows). Sinn concluded that Target2 was a de facto a bailout system for the euro.102 This claim was strongly denied by the ECB. Jürgen Stark, a member of its Executive Board, even went as far as saying that some commentators could lose their reputation as serious academics by claiming that Target2 functions as a bailout system.103 The ECB refused to publish the Target2 balances of the individual Eurozone NCBs until September 2015....."
That is part of the issue, quite a few years ago, being...……"....
described as something that could 'become' something to worry about if not addressed." but - "....it has not been addressed and therefore...………"
Now - fast forward a few years and the issue has become terminal - and again the paper that you linked sets this out......
For the Euro to have ever have a chance of working - as your linked paper excellently explains - it needed to satisfy the conditions of an 'Optimal Currency Area'. Such conditions are well understood - and whilst the Euro failed initially - the aspiration was to achieve that - but without fiscal and political union from the outset it has not only failed -the position has long since past the point at which it could be addressed and it has become terminal. Indeed, the situation was already accelerating in the wrong direction - and then along has come Covid-19.
The paper that you linked covers this in irrefutable depth - amongst the many compelling statements, you will find this on page 36 from Otmar Issing, the ECB’s first chief economist and one of the founding fathers of monetary union, who admitted that the ECB is becoming dangerously over-extended and the whole euro project is unworkable in its current form (emphasis on the final paragraph):
One day, the house of cards will collapse. The euro has been betrayed by politics, the experiment went wrong from the beginning and has since degenerated into a fiscal free-for-all that once again masks the festering pathologies. Realistically, it will be a case of muddling through, struggling from one crisis to the next. It is difficult to forecast how long this will continue for, but it cannot go on endlessly…The Stability and Growth Pact has more or less failed. The moral hazard is overwhelming. Market discipline is done away with by ECB interventions. There is no fiscal control mechanism from markets or politics. This has all the elements to bring disaster for monetary union. The no-bailout clause is violated every day and the European Court's approval for bailout measures is simple-minded and ideological.…The ECB has crossed the Rubicon and is now in an untenable position, trying to reconcile conflicting roles as banking regulator, Troika enforcer in rescue missions and agent of monetary policy. Its own financial integrity is increasingly in jeopardy.
The venture began to go off the rails immediately, though the structural damage was disguised by the financial boom. There was no speed-up of convergence after 1999 – rather, the opposite. From day one, quite a number of countries started working in the wrong direction. A string of states let rip with wage rises, brushing aside warnings that this would prove fatal in an irrevocable currency union. During the first eight years, unit labour costs in Portugal rose by 30% versus Germany. In the past, the escudo would have devalued by 30%, and things more or less would be back to where they were. Quite a few countries – including Ireland, Italy and Greece – behaved as though they could still devalue their currencies. The elemental problem is that once a high-debt state has lost 30% in competitiveness within a fixed exchange system, it is almost impossible to claw back the ground in the sort of deflationary world we face today. It has become a trap. The whole Eurozone structure has acquired a contractionary bias. The deflation is now self-fulling. The first Greek rescue in 2010 was little more than a bailout for German and French banks. It would have been far better to eject Greece from the euro as a salutary lesson for all. The Greeks should have been offered generous support, but only after it had restored exchange rate viability by returning to the drachma. [The fear was a chain-reaction reaching Spain and Italy, detonating an uncontrollable financial collapse. This nearly happened on two occasions, and remained a risk until Berlin switched tack and agreed to let the ECB shore up the Spanish and Italian debt markets in 2012.
Cloaking it all is obfuscation, political mendacity and endemic denial. Leaders of the heavily indebted states have misled their voters with soothing bromides, falsely suggesting that some form of fiscal union or debt mutualisation is just around the corner. Yet there is no chance of political union or the creation of an EU treasury in the forseeable future, which would in any case require a sweeping change to the German constitution – an impossible proposition in the current political climate. The European project must therefore function as a union of sovereign states, or fail.
I will post some other relevant extracts in another post - rather than make this one too long