A summer transfer window in which Arsenal's key weaknesses were once
again ignored has been followed swiftly by an underwhelming start to the
new season, with Arsene Wenger preoccupied with a now routine defence of
the form and attitude of club-record signing Mesut Ozil, urging fans not
to turn the World Cup winner into a "scapegoat" for the Gunners's
shortcomings.
However, after a virtuoso performance against Aston Villa upon his
return to his favoured No.10 role – having previously spent several
months, beginning under Joachim Low with Germany, lining up in the
relative wilderness of the left wing – it has become increasingly clear
that Ozil is not the problem.
Rather, the former Real Madrid playmaker is a victim of a system
overloaded and bloated by the presence of so many No.10s, all vying for
the same space, all making the same runs. Ozil was granted a brief
respite at Villa Park – with Jack Wilshere and Alexis Sanchez both left
on the bench, the 25-year-old was given a freer role behind lone
frontman Danny Welbeck – but is expected to return to the left when
Tottenham visit on Saturday.
By accident or design, Wenger has built a squad flooded with diminutive
creators all trying to be squeezed into the same starting XI. In the
Frenchman’s opinion, Ozil is the player most suited to playing out wide
– even though he has shown a lack of appreciation for the position that
borders on contempt – while he also believes that the German should be
just as capable of taking up the positions that saw him score and assist
against Villa whether he is in the hole or not.
"Zinedine Zidane went to Real Madrid for £82 million [sic] and he played
on the left. There was never a debate and he had to play there,"
explained Wenger. "Because in the middle they had Raul and Ronaldo he
made room and played on the left. When you have the ball you play where
you want and go where you want.
"It is a debate as old as the world. Since we played football. When you
look at the Brazil team in 1970 they had Tostao, Rivelino, Pele,
Jairzinho, Gerson, Clodoaldo. They all played No.10 in their clubs. They
put them all together and they won the World Cup in a convincing way.
"What is Wilshere but basically a No.10? He played his whole life at
No.10. Somebody had to go out there [to the left]. Is it Wilshere, Ozil,
[Aaron] Ramsey? Nobody is really natural out wide. So you keep good
players out or you try to get them together."
What was originally intended as a defence of Ozil instead became a
revealing insight into Wenger’s thought processes about how he intends
his side to line-up and play. In conjuring romantic images of Madrid’s
Galacticos and the Selecao of 1970, Wenger is pining for an unrealistic,
unachievable style – one that barely worked then, with a roster of
superstars, and is dramatically harder to implement with Welbeck leading
the line and Mikel Arteta anchoring the midfield.
In the Mexico World Cup, Mario Zagallo fielded perhaps the purest
attacking side in football history, one concerned entirely with their
own samba style, though there was an almost total disregard for balance
and solidity – in fact, Zagallo’s predecessor, Joao Saldahna, had toyed
with the idea of dropping Pele due to his lack of work rate, a notion
that resulted in his dismissal.
Similarly, at the turn of the century, Madrid began building a side
based on individual talent and fame rather than how they worked within,
and complimented, a pre-existing system. Initially the side’s firepower
flourished, winning the Champions League and La Liga in back-to-back
seasons, but the decision to cram as many attacking stars into one team
ultimately resulted in domestic and European trophy droughts of varying
lengths.
Both Zagallo’s Brazil and Madrid at their most Galactico- obsessed are
tied together by the necessity in the former’s case and the desire in
the latter’s to field all their best players at the same time. Brazil
got away with it, but Madrid – as a succession of fired managers attests
– did not. It is both strange and worrying, therefore, that Wenger
should use these sides, Madrid more so, as examples of his ideology at
its most successful.
Zidane was used predominantly in the hole upon moving to the Spanish
capital, something overlooked by Wenger, until the arrival of Ronaldo
pushed the Frenchman out wide – Madrid prospered initially, winning La
Liga in 2002-03, though it would not last. From that point onwards the
side’s balance and cohesion was progressively chipped away at, to the
point that they will be remembered as one of the biggest underachievers
in recent memory.
The arrival of David Beckham, and departure of Claude Makelele, robbed
los Blancos of their last ounce of solidity. "Why put another layer of
gold paint on the Bentley when you are losing the entire engine?"
bemoaned Zidane at the time. It was not until Fabio Capello brought a
semblance of catenaccio to the Bernabeu some years later that they
reclaimed the title, with Mahamadou Diarra taking over the ‘Makelele role’.
That Wenger should cite Madrid and the 1970 Brazil side as benchmarks
reveals a certain naivety. Even with Galacticos such an ideal was
virtually impossible to implement – too many cooks angling for the same
space, bereft of the requisite counter-balances to compliment such
attacking talent – but such a notion seems even more idealistic in
today’s football, with space and time at such a premium and
ultra-aggressive pressing strategies being used by so many sides.
Wenger revealed recently that he is driven to achieve "the perfect game"
but his definition of what that might entail feels outdated – his
line-up is brimming with craft but light on steel. Borussia Dortmund
highlighted how vulnerable this Arsenal side is to being put under the
kind of pressure they themselves seem incapable of exerting, with Jurgen
Klopp lauding the "perfection" of his side’s pressing, though it’s
unlikely his counterpart would ever hold those traits of bravery and
aggression in such esteem.
It presents a curious trade-off for Wenger, who must either sacrifice
one of his many, much-loved playmakers or continue to shoehorn them into
the side at the expense of both individual displays, with Ozil
struggling when shunted out of the hole, and the dynamic of a side as a
whole.
Solutions are hard to come by too. A midfield diamond has superseded a
back three as the current in vogue formation and it is a setup that
might have worked for Arsenal’s plethora of playmakers were it not for
the absence of a thoroughbred defensive midfielder in the side. Again,
Wenger’s failure to address this area has robbed a means of bringing
balance to the team, and led to a desperate insistence that Abou Diaby,
fresh from overcoming a 40th different injury, can fulfil that role.
Wenger’s philosophy will be given another thorough examination in the
north London derby, when his own side, focused predominantly on their
own creative strengths, meet a Spurs side being built to stifle and
rattle. It is encounters such as Saturday’s that will begin to show
whether his No.10 obsession, and his hope that the side can click in the
same vein that Brazil did in 1970, is achievable – or, alternatively, if
the perfection he seeks is both unattainable and even archaic.