But the key change came from Mancini. Maicon picked up an injury and had to be replaced, and Zabaleta was the natural replacement. When he entered the pitch, Zabaleta clearly signalled ‘3′ to his teammates – which hints that the previous formation had been slightly more flexible. (Mancini had definitely changed system at the break, but if he’d changed to a permanent three-man defence why would Zabaleta need to tell his teammates they were playing three at the back? He would have just replaced Maicon with no further tactical instructions required).
Zabaleta could have been the man to secure the win – Maicon was tired, and Zabaleta could have sat deep alongside the centre-backs and kept that side of the pitch quiet. However, he interpreted the wing-back role in a strange way – charging forward up the pitch unnecessarily (when City were ahead) and also getting drawn into very central positions, leaving the right flank completely bare.
City were now a shambles at the back, particularly down that flank. Kompany seemed completely unsure of his role, sometimes drifting too far towards the touchline (which left an unlikely centre-back pairing of Clichy and Nastasic in the centre), and sometimes remaining so central that Zabaleta was exposed two-versus-one by Ronaldo and Marcelo. Those two players had 15 shots between them over the course of the game – you expect that from Ronaldo, but the space afforded to Marcelo was extraordinary.
Real’s first and third goals came from their left – on both occasions, there simply weren’t enough City players on that side of the pitch. For that, both Mancini’s tinkering and Zabaleta’s poor positional play must take the blame.
Conclusion
The final 15 minutes of the game was unrecognisable from the first 15, and with such a frantic climax to the match, it could have gone either way. Better goalkeeping from Joe Hart, for example, and City would have come away with a result.
But there was a glaring problem with City’s right for the final 20 minutes of the match, with the very basic problem being that City were undermanned on that flank. Somewhere amongst (a) Mancini’s decision to change formation (b) his instructions to his players (c) and Zabaleta’s positioning, City had a clear weakness that was fully exploited by Real.
