I can see how you would come to that erroneous conclusion from my comment. I see it as two separate things. I have posted often about Swinson and Corbyns 'criminal' culpability in not working together. The fact that they clearly both had egos which precluded that necessary and sensible step betrayed Remain voters completely and inevitably lead to attempts to organise Remain voters down the tactical voting path. There were numerous organisations that launched websites where you just entered your postcode and up popped a recommendation as to who to vote for to avoid splitting the Remain vote. It was expected that if voters followed these recommendations then up to 70 additional seats could be won by the relative 'remain' parties. In reality hardly any were and votes were indeed split. Combined with Labours abject performance the Tory majority was delivered. This was the failure I was referring to. Hope that clarifies.
Yes - indeed - we have generally the same point of view - although with some slightly different takes and I would take it a step further.
1. We seem to agree that from this point onwards the outcome that is achieved will be entirely down to the performance of the Tory government in negotiations - and, at least as importantly, the quality of their portfolio, programme and project management arrangements.
2. My strong view is that the UK starts from a position that is much worse than it was in June 2016 due to a) the incompetence of May/ Robbins and b) the self-serving machinations of the main opposition parties. We may or may not agree on none, some or all of that.
3. The clear opportunity for the main opposition parties in the Autumn / Winter of 2019 was to force a 2nd referendum before going for a GE. Therefore it is a simple fact that there was a chance not taken to put a 2nd referendum to the electorate and perhaps stop Brexit from happening - that chance will not come again. The simplest way for that to have happened would have been for Corbyn to agree to another leader temporarily and for a fixed period of time, fronting the Labour Party in a Unity Government to hold the referendum and then hold a GE - if he did that the rest would have followed. I would hope that we mainly agree on that.
4. Agreeing to the GE was directly playing into the Tory and Leave supporters hands - at the time we were desperate for the opportunity - in fact it felt like a 'last throw of the dice' to get Brexit achieved. I for one expected the opposition parties to refuse the call for a GE and indulged themselves in more months of fun dragging Johnson's arse through amendment after amendment. You have to question the party and individual specific reasons why the parties opted for the GE rather than a 2nd referendum.
As it turns out - 12th December happened and the rest will now be history.
5. This lack of working together carried on into the run up to the GE and this is the area where we have slightly different views - or slightly different interpretations because Tactical Voting could have been so better managed and then would not I suggest have been a failure.
Yes - I recognise that there were plenty of apps made available to help determine where to tactically vote to support Remain, but - in this world of long-standing party loyalty - what there was not was direction from the leader of the Labour Party. There are a lot of dyed in the wool loyal voters and for a lot of Labour supporters it would have taken direction from Labour to tactical vote.
For me a clever play for Corbyn would have do have 'done a Farage' and work with the other parties to agree to stand down - for this election only - Labour candidates where that was sensible to support tactical voting and to major on the message that bringing down the Conservatives government / Stopping austerity etc. etc. was on this occasion the greatest priority of all.
That would have given the 'anti-Tory and ante-Brexit' voters the focus they needed. Johnson had a simple message - "Get Brexit done" - "stop the Tories' could have been equally powerful'.
Without such an approach and in going for a Labour majority, Corbyn put all the eggs in one (as it turned out a Leaver) basket and the result on the 12th was unequivocal. Had he instead worked with the other parties then a potential (probable?) outcome would have been an hung parliament with the Tories unable to form a government because all the other parties had united against them and Corbyn then being invited to form a coalition government.
Another possible approach for Corbyn would have been to declare this election to be a Brexit election with another election to follow after the Brexit issue had been settled. I say this because, equally there are a lot of pro-Remain Tory voters that would not tactically vote without the clear instruction that their vote would only be temporarily 'lent' with a GE to follow the Labour held referendum.
I think that we can agree parts of these 'hypothetical opportunities' - that Corbyn denied. At least I think that we can agree that the path he chose was not the best?
So I have and will continue to argue that should we end up in a future No-Deal outcome then history should note these circumstances and Corbyn will shoulder a significant level of responsibility.
Not because of what happens from now - that is down to the Tories
But because he indeed had the chance to stop the opportunity for a Brexit GE being held in December 2019 - and he did not take it.
