There are a couple of points in there that I think will be really interesting to observe over the coming weeks and months - and which will indicate just where the key negotiating areas are and what the fallback positions might be.
I do not for a moment fail to recognise that the EU are - on the face of it - in the strongest position and have much leverage to use. I just do not take it always as a given that the UK will have to/choose to comply - as they would of course done with the utter amateur Robbins running things.
Other noises coming out of the EU is a delay to the start of negotiations - a very different stance to 2016. I would expect this as they will be needing time (as will the UK) to properly prepare their strategy, approach and governance - again I see this as a good sign from a negotiating POV.
Strangely, you might think, I would not be greatly surprised at this point if the situation is as you say - ".....albeit those by the Chancellor are now varying by the hour to the extent it seems either the UK has no strategy or if it has then the
Chancellor is not privy to it."
And you are right that the part of the EU's approach will be to seek to again dictate the sequencing - let us hope that we have learned from past incompetence and have a plan of how to address this challenge.
You are right to observe - although I would word it very differently that the ".
...EU don’t want any weaselling out of what has been agreed in the WA." The utterly ruinous unfettered backstop may have been removed, but there is much poison still in what remains largely the May/Robbins WA.
That is May's legacy - our starting position is worse now because of what needs to be unpicked from her WA than it was in 2016.
I have a similar view - but different take - on your last point: "
....Outside of that then it’s down to a basic deal on the key issues that matter to the EU or no deal...."
You again word things reflecting your view that the UK will buckle to the all-powerful EU and of course your take is that any areas that will be agreed will be those prioritised by the EU and the UK will be dictated to. My own view is that there will be a late agreement on a deal to prevent a No-Deal outcome and that the deal will be in fact a number of key agreements and a framework, process and timetable to agree others - with the status quo continuing until each sector is agreed. I expect this to reflect (eventually) a genuine Canada++ but introduced incrementally in a way that ensures that neither party is seen to have won/lost but instead are seen to confirm and celebrate a close partnership.
The extent to which that your view or mine prevail will be dependent of course on the extent to which we have assessed and prepared to execute a walk-away option if it comes to that. This is needed because it has always been true that we will not see movement from the EU unless and until they face a viable walk-away option and the political will to use it.
Viability and political will have always been the key words. We have a situation now where the political will may be present, supported by the governance (large majority) to act - I hope that in secure rooms in Westminster a small group of people are plotting how to achieve viability.