@jaseiraiI watched the second presentation. A German with a sense of humour! I liked his metaphor about monopoly, that was certainly me as a child.
Whilst I found some of his anecdotes a little difficult to believe - the President of the Bundesbank needed an economist to tell him what an asset item on his balance sheet was - really, I found it an interesting presentation.
Target 2 was never intended to be used as it is being. It was supposed to be a relatively simple RTSG system facilitating payments between Euro central banks. I would be lying if i claimed to know about this previously and all the times I was genuinely asking for reasons to support Brexit you had this up your sleeve ;-). Having read a bit more about the issue this morning, there are a range of views amongst German economists about just how serious this is, but from my relatively noddy appreciation of macro economics it is a shitty stick and I can well understand how it would form a strong part of a brexit case. That this is the first time anyone on here has raised it makes me think it is not widely known.
I also found this paper which I thought was helpful
https://www.cass.city.ac.uk/faculti...t-system-keeps-the-euro-project-alive-for-now
a couple of extracts:
How much longer will Germany’s hard-working, inflation-averse population tolerate paying for other countries’ excesses? There is considerable anger across the Eurozone’s largest economy, even though most voters don’t know the half of it. Obscure data shows that under so-called Target2 operations, the ECB’s intraeurozone payments system, the Bundesbank is owed a mighty €620bn by other member states. This stealth bail-out dwarfs German’s covert contributions to previous Eurozone rescues, which themselves provoked bitter public criticism.
More recently, Evans-Pritchard wrote:
Vast liabilities are being switched quietly from private banks and investment funds onto the shoulders of taxpayers across southern Europe. It is a variant of the tragic episode in Greece, but this time on a far larger scale, and with systemic global implications. There has been no democratic decision by any parliament to take on these fiscal debts, rapidly approaching €1 trillion. They are the unintended side-effect of quantitative easing by the European Central Bank, which has degenerated into a conduit for capital flight from the Club Med bloc to Germany, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. This 'socialisation of risk' is happening by stealth, a mechanical effect of the ECB's Target2 payments system. If a political upset in France or Italy triggers an existential euro crisis over coming months, citizens from both the Eurozone's debtor and creditor countries will discover to their horror what has been done to them.
I thought the papers conclusions summed their findings up very succinctly:
To conclude, the answers to the four specific questions asked at the beginning are:
• No, the Eurozone is not an Optimal Currency Area. This is because it does not satisfy the conditions for monetary union. These conditions can only be satisfied if the Eurozone adopts fiscal and political union by becoming a federal state.
• The euro can therefore survive only so long as Germany, in particular, continues – albeit reluctantly – to finance the balance of payments deficits of other Eurozone members, in particular, Italy and Spain. This requires it both to recycle its trade surpluses back to countries with trade deficits and to be the main recipient of capital flight from Eurozone states with weak and weakening banking systems.
• Target2, the apparently innocuous Eurozone payments system, is critical to facilitating the payment flows between surplus and deficit countries. The Target2 credits of countries such as Germany almost exactly match the balance of payments deficits of countries such as Italy and Spain. Since these deficits can never be repaid, the euro can only survive if Germany, in particular, agrees to mutualise Eurozone debts so that the Eurozone becomes a transfer union.
• Political union together with a common fiscal as well as monetary policy is the only realistic way of saving the euro in the long term and avoid further failed rescue packages.208 This is, of course, what Europe’s political establishment wants and has been preparing for since the days of Jean Monnet, but it is not obvious that this is what the people of Europe want. However, given the size of the Target2 imbalances, it is also conceivable that the Eurozone will not survive and will eventually break up; this becomes more likely if political support for the euro project, particularly in Germany, begins to wane.
Target2 is indeed the silent bailout system that keeps the euro afloat – for now.
If Italy were to trigger a new Euro crisis, the only two outcomes would seem to be the collapse of the Euro project (and Brexit or not we would not come out of that unscathed) or the final push of Euro states into a single political and fiscal union where all financial power would lie in the old Germany. Given the cultural differences, I would say option 1. is the far more likely.
So thanks for posting. It has shifted my thinking a little and I will follow this with interest. For fellow 'remainers' please correct me if you think I am missing something here or overstating the importance of the issue.
This was the only 'thoughtful' response from Remainers that I could find - generally, as another poster observed:
The silence is (was) deafening.
