He gave the Czechs an absolute promise not to sacrifice them to Germany’s expansion. Then he plotted with the French to hand over Sudetenland to Hitler. A moral betrayal of the worst kind which led to the death of millions. The Czechs have never forgotten or forgiven.
You are using an out of date browser. It may not display this or other websites correctly.
You should upgrade or use an alternative browser.
You should upgrade or use an alternative browser.
Boris Johnson
- Thread starter ganganvince
- Start date
gordondaviesmoustache
Well-Known Member
I’m not sure anything you’ve posted there bolsters your argument about his competence, especially in relation to those two useless cunts.He gave the Czechs an absolute promise not to sacrifice them to Germany’s expansion. Then he plotted with the French to hand over Sudetenland to Hitler. A moral betrayal of the worst kind which led to the death of millions. The Czechs have never forgotten or forgiven.
threespires
Well-Known Member
- Joined
- 7 Aug 2019
- Messages
- 6,249
- Team supported
- City
Whatever view you take of Chamberlain's failures there's a serious analysis historians can undertake in relation to him, whereas what is there to say about Johnson? Other than a man with no moral compass who fucked over his entire country for his own personal gain and ambition there is nothing else to be said about him. Historians may be very interested in the forces behind both his and Truss's rise to power but in terms of the man himself he's just a treacherous douchebag.
I’m thinking that, like Chamberlain, you feel giving the promise in the first place was entirely competent. I think it was a huge blunder. Whether it would have made any practical difference is moot, but probably not. But the moral issue remains. Many have argued here that there is no point in negotiating with Putin as he would just break his word later. Quite so.I’m not sure anything you’ve posted there bolsters your argument about his competence, especially in relation to those two useless cunts.
gordondaviesmoustache
Well-Known Member
Strategically, it was probably the most competent thing to do.I’m thinking that, like Chamberlain, you feel giving the promise in the first place was entirely competent. I think it was a huge blunder. Whether it would have made any practical difference is moot, but probably not.
No! Is Putin then strategically competent whenever he breaks his word?Strategically, it was probably the most competent thing to do.
gordondaviesmoustache
Well-Known Member
Plainly not, given where he is now, following him breaking his word. He’s plainly a poor strategist as he’s unilaterally elected to involve himself unnecessarily in a war that has crippled his county economically, caused it to be isolated and greatly reduced in its national standing, has led to the death of hundreds of thousands of young men in a country that is facing a demographic time bomb in a generation or so and has caused NATO to expand, which was the express aim of the invasion, despite his pitiful attempts to reference neo-nazis. He’s clearly a shit strategist, his judgement clouded no doubt by having too much power for too long.No! Is Putin then strategically competent whenever he breaks his word?
Whereas Chamberlain most likely bought us enough time to make it more likely that we weren’t completely overwhelmed when we went to war with Germany. And it was unquestionably a very close run thing, so every month would have counted, most likely. This enabled us to stay into the fight until happenstance intervened and Japan went postal, and Hitler got distracted by his innate suspicion and hatred of the Slavs and communism. By any objective analysis we’d have been fucked going to war in 1938, and there would have been much less appetite domestically at that time. A final line needed to be drawn to make another war palatable to the general public after what had gone on a couple of decades before. So, overall, I think there’s a strong argument the Chamberlain made an effective strategic call, given the circumstances.
So drawing a parallel between broken promises and strategic competence is a straw man argument I’m afraid to say. It’s a wholly separate argument, and one for which you have justification for advancing, but not within the realms of this subject which was one of competence, not morality.
The perfect fumble
Well-Known Member
- Joined
- 3 Jun 2012
- Messages
- 24,463
I’m thinking that, like Chamberlain, you feel giving the promise in the first place was entirely competent. I think it was a huge blunder. Whether it would have made any practical difference is moot, but probably not. But the moral issue remains. Many have argued here that there is no point in negotiating with Putin as he would just break his word later. Quite so.
Chamberlain knew that the threat of a two front war kept Hitler's ambitions partially contained, but after the Ribbentrop- Molotov pact a European and then a global conflict was inevitable. That was not Chamberlain's fault nor could he have done anything to prevent it. Had the allies continued to occupy the Rhineland instead of leaving in 1930 it might have been a different story, but that wasn't on Chamberlains watch.
People forget that Chamberlain only became Prime Minister in 1937, he inherited most of the things for which he was subsequently blamed. Because he died in November 1940 it was convenient to place all the ills of that period at Chamberlain's door, but it's a bad reading of history.
Last edited:
The case is simple.Plainly not, given where he is now, following him breaking his word. He’s plainly a poor strategist as he’s unilaterally elected to involve himself unnecessarily in a war that has crippled his county economically, caused it to be isolated and greatly reduced in its national standing, has led to the death of hundreds of thousands of young men in a country that is facing a demographic time bomb in a generation or so and has caused NATO to expand, which was the express aim of the invasion, despite his pitiful attempts to reference neo-nazis. He’s clearly a shit strategist, his judgement clouded no doubt by having too much power for too long.
Whereas Chamberlain most likely bought us enough time to make it more likely that we weren’t completely overwhelmed when we went to war with Germany. And it was unquestionably a very close run thing, so every month would have counted, most likely. This enabled us to stay into the fight until happenstance intervened and Japan went postal, and Hitler got distracted by his innate suspicion and hatred of the Slavs and communism. By any objective analysis we’d have been fucked going to war in 1938, and there would have been much less appetite domestically at that time. A final line needed to be drawn to make another war palatable to the general public after what had gone on a couple of decades before. So, overall, I think there’s a strong argument the Chamberlain made an effective strategic call, given the circumstances.
So drawing a parallel between broken promises and strategic competence is a straw man argument I’m afraid to say. It’s a wholly separate argument, and one for which you have justification for advancing, but not within the realms of this subject which was one of competence, not morality.
The National gov of 1931 on should have rearmed, so that is not on Chamberlain.
But from 1932 onwards it was abundantly clear that Hitler’s aim for lebensraum was not for negotiation. He was going to do it come what may.
By 1938 Chamberlain should have been quite clear what was going to happen. For that reason the promise to the Czechs was not going to make a difference and reneging on it simply encouraged Hitler. Contemporary German sources show that Hitler believed Chamberlain was a naive fool. It is possible that Chamberlain actually believed his famous piece of paper was really a guarantee of no war.
The gap to the invasion of Poland was just one year and the allies were no more ready for war than before as the 6 weeks to Dunkirk showed. Was the declaration of war as a response an admission that earlier policy was wrong?
The casting of Chamberlain’s policy as a strategic decision is rather editing history.
I cannot accept that a morally disgraceful policy was strategically correct and therefore o.k., especially as keeping our promise would have made no practical difference. I see Munich 1938 as British foreign policy’s modern moral low point, and there have been a few!
BrianW
Well-Known Member
- Joined
- 6 Mar 2006
- Messages
- 5,917
- Team supported
- There's Only One City
In the 1930s, it was only a short time from WW1 in which almost every family had lost sons, husbands, brothers, fathers and uncles.
No one wanted war. That was a political reality. Large numbers signed up for the Peace Pledge Union and pacifism was commonplace.
There was also a massive economic slump. The Government was not in a position to spend vast sums of money and no one wanted to pay more tax. (Like today, funnily enough.)
In this sense, at least, democracies were at a great disadvantage. You can only do what voters will allow. Fascist and communist dictators do not have this issue.
The political appetite for rearmament only started to surge in the late 1930s when it became clear what Adolf was about. Even then, many influential voices (not least in the upper classes and royalty) still did not want to fight Germany. The feeling that Germany was a bulwark against communism was strong, and the Nazis had quite a good image among certain circles. (They either did not know the full SP or did not care. Also many were antisemitic. Antisemitic in the sense of hating Jews for being Jews.)
As the Duke of Wellington said about Waterloo, it was a damned close-run thing. Weapons like Spitfires and the KGV battleships only came online at the very last moment and after about 12 months the country was effectively bankrupt.
No one wanted war. That was a political reality. Large numbers signed up for the Peace Pledge Union and pacifism was commonplace.
There was also a massive economic slump. The Government was not in a position to spend vast sums of money and no one wanted to pay more tax. (Like today, funnily enough.)
In this sense, at least, democracies were at a great disadvantage. You can only do what voters will allow. Fascist and communist dictators do not have this issue.
The political appetite for rearmament only started to surge in the late 1930s when it became clear what Adolf was about. Even then, many influential voices (not least in the upper classes and royalty) still did not want to fight Germany. The feeling that Germany was a bulwark against communism was strong, and the Nazis had quite a good image among certain circles. (They either did not know the full SP or did not care. Also many were antisemitic. Antisemitic in the sense of hating Jews for being Jews.)
As the Duke of Wellington said about Waterloo, it was a damned close-run thing. Weapons like Spitfires and the KGV battleships only came online at the very last moment and after about 12 months the country was effectively bankrupt.