Thanks. Just read some of those and, to be honest, they aren't desperately insightful. The author is a guy called Jason Stephens, who is a qualified coach but lectures at UCFB, the college specialising in football business. He's gone through publicly-available records at Companies House, so he's hardly MI6.
One thing he did say that caught my eye "
This structure allows intra-group transactions that inflate Manchester City’s FFP-compliant revenue by 22% annually", but he doesn't explain how.
He also says the following about Financial Fair Play:
Clubs exploit regulatory fragmentation through three primary channels:
- Revenue Splitting: Allocating commercial income to non-football entities
- Cost Shifting: Attributing expenses to subsidiaries not subject to FFP
- Asset Inflation: Overvaluing subsidiary-held assets used as financial collateral
I'm not sure he understands FFP properly, as a subsidiary that provides 'football services" falls within the FFP reporting perimeter. And why would a club seeking to maximise revenue for FFP purposes allocate income to non-football parties.
Might have been quite insightful if he'd backed up some of the points he makes with concrete examples. He doesn't seem to have an overt agenda so I might drop him a message to get his thinking behind some of these claims.