Scottyboi
Well-Known Member
MILITARY & STRATEGIC:
KOLOTILIVKA - NEW FRONT? NEW OPPORTUNITY!
New information from the area of Kolotilivka, on the Russians side of the border barely 1km in, shows what appears last Saturday, to have been a fight the Russians lost for the border checkpoint.
Tanks and troops have been witnessed crossing the frontier. However little information - again tight opsec, is coming out but let’s look at why this might matter.
The position has a major metalled road that runs into Russian territory through the small town. The town itself is roughly half way between the Kursk incursion and the Russian forces in the Liptsy sector of their Kharkiv incursion.
The border runs north-south here before turning west-east at the Liptsy section.
That places the new front opening above and potentially behind the Russians Kharkiv operation. The main road connects almost directly to Belgorod - the most crucial logistics hub for the Russians in Kharkiv and the whole of the northern sector of the main front.
If this is the development it appears to be - and as many as two brigades may be involved though that’s only an observation rather than a concrete assessment, then it can do several things to aid Ukraine’s position.
Firstly it slices off any possibility of Russian troops being quickly deployed to the southern part of the Kursk incursion when they risk the possibility of being attacked from the west while in transit. It acts as a flanking defence for the Ukrainians. Over time Kursk forces and those from Kolotilivka could meet up and consolidate a huge area before Russians can reach it.
At the same time the Kolotilivka attack doesn’t have to strike north or northeast to reach the Kursk forces - but wait for them to reach it as they push east and south east.
This would enable them to begin to jeopardise the Russian positions in Kharkiv longer term, while potentially slicing off their supply routes from Belgorod.
Ukraine doesn’t need to take Kursk or Belgorod - both major urban centres- but if they fell without a fight in the wider longer term plan, they would. But they don’t need to. They just need to cut off the Russians from their rail and road supply networks to impede their movement in countering the Ukrainians, at the same time as seriously impacting Russian operations through interdiction of their supply chain.
The whole key to this is mobility, command and control.
Dangers of course abound. Not least the further in Ukraine gets the more complex becomes its own supply chain. The wider and thinner its own forces become.
We already know the Russians have pulled units from their main operations and as far as Kherson - but it takes days and masses of rail and road transport to extract, move, redeploy and get them into the field. Operationally this needs to be done well away from where the Ukrainians attack is coming from or they won’t have a unified force to defend with if they try and deploy into a combat area in range. The trouble is the flexibility of the Ukrainian units and their willingness to engage or not, on their terms, makes it difficult to know what is a safe place that’s not too far from the operational area. This of course is what Ukraine needs - Russians constantly on the back foot and unable to reliably coordinate.
The Russians are making a rod for their own back too. Splitting the strategic command of the operation between the non-military trained FSB and the real army is just asking for trouble. These things in Russia just don’t work well, they’re not supposed to because the lack of cross departmental coordination is part of securing any autocratic government. Nobody wants power centre’s coordinating potential resistance to the autocrat.
Overall, if the situation expands as it looks like it will potentially, then this is another twist in what could be a war changing plan.
Ultimately as I said the other day, it will force a major rejig of Russian forces and disrupt almost solidified supply lines out of threat or necessity. At this stage in the war that’s a major upset for the Russians.
This is like World War One in so many ways.
The western front had been stuck in place with few changes of any significance for three and half years. The major German offensive the summer of 1918 exhausted them as Russia’s is testing it.
As the Germans sat behind their defences the allied offensive with mobile forces- the first truly major operation of its kind at Amiens in 1918 broke through in such a way, so fast and so deep it set off a whole chain of cascading events that led to the armistice.
This is potentially such a moment. It holds great promise but it must be executed with utter ruthlessness and determination. Failure really isn’t an option.
And still I cannot help but think Kherson and Crimea hang like overripe fruit, a tempting place for a surprise operation. Maybe just wishful thinking.
‘The Analyst’ MilStratOnX
Slava Ukraine !
KOLOTILIVKA - NEW FRONT? NEW OPPORTUNITY!
New information from the area of Kolotilivka, on the Russians side of the border barely 1km in, shows what appears last Saturday, to have been a fight the Russians lost for the border checkpoint.
Tanks and troops have been witnessed crossing the frontier. However little information - again tight opsec, is coming out but let’s look at why this might matter.
The position has a major metalled road that runs into Russian territory through the small town. The town itself is roughly half way between the Kursk incursion and the Russian forces in the Liptsy sector of their Kharkiv incursion.
The border runs north-south here before turning west-east at the Liptsy section.
That places the new front opening above and potentially behind the Russians Kharkiv operation. The main road connects almost directly to Belgorod - the most crucial logistics hub for the Russians in Kharkiv and the whole of the northern sector of the main front.
If this is the development it appears to be - and as many as two brigades may be involved though that’s only an observation rather than a concrete assessment, then it can do several things to aid Ukraine’s position.
Firstly it slices off any possibility of Russian troops being quickly deployed to the southern part of the Kursk incursion when they risk the possibility of being attacked from the west while in transit. It acts as a flanking defence for the Ukrainians. Over time Kursk forces and those from Kolotilivka could meet up and consolidate a huge area before Russians can reach it.
At the same time the Kolotilivka attack doesn’t have to strike north or northeast to reach the Kursk forces - but wait for them to reach it as they push east and south east.
This would enable them to begin to jeopardise the Russian positions in Kharkiv longer term, while potentially slicing off their supply routes from Belgorod.
Ukraine doesn’t need to take Kursk or Belgorod - both major urban centres- but if they fell without a fight in the wider longer term plan, they would. But they don’t need to. They just need to cut off the Russians from their rail and road supply networks to impede their movement in countering the Ukrainians, at the same time as seriously impacting Russian operations through interdiction of their supply chain.
The whole key to this is mobility, command and control.
Dangers of course abound. Not least the further in Ukraine gets the more complex becomes its own supply chain. The wider and thinner its own forces become.
We already know the Russians have pulled units from their main operations and as far as Kherson - but it takes days and masses of rail and road transport to extract, move, redeploy and get them into the field. Operationally this needs to be done well away from where the Ukrainians attack is coming from or they won’t have a unified force to defend with if they try and deploy into a combat area in range. The trouble is the flexibility of the Ukrainian units and their willingness to engage or not, on their terms, makes it difficult to know what is a safe place that’s not too far from the operational area. This of course is what Ukraine needs - Russians constantly on the back foot and unable to reliably coordinate.
The Russians are making a rod for their own back too. Splitting the strategic command of the operation between the non-military trained FSB and the real army is just asking for trouble. These things in Russia just don’t work well, they’re not supposed to because the lack of cross departmental coordination is part of securing any autocratic government. Nobody wants power centre’s coordinating potential resistance to the autocrat.
Overall, if the situation expands as it looks like it will potentially, then this is another twist in what could be a war changing plan.
Ultimately as I said the other day, it will force a major rejig of Russian forces and disrupt almost solidified supply lines out of threat or necessity. At this stage in the war that’s a major upset for the Russians.
This is like World War One in so many ways.
The western front had been stuck in place with few changes of any significance for three and half years. The major German offensive the summer of 1918 exhausted them as Russia’s is testing it.
As the Germans sat behind their defences the allied offensive with mobile forces- the first truly major operation of its kind at Amiens in 1918 broke through in such a way, so fast and so deep it set off a whole chain of cascading events that led to the armistice.
This is potentially such a moment. It holds great promise but it must be executed with utter ruthlessness and determination. Failure really isn’t an option.
And still I cannot help but think Kherson and Crimea hang like overripe fruit, a tempting place for a surprise operation. Maybe just wishful thinking.
‘The Analyst’ MilStratOnX
Slava Ukraine !