ZenHalfTimeCrock
Well-Known Member
- Joined
- 18 Apr 2019
- Messages
- 1,446
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- Manchester City
More from Neumann:
'...a religion which has existed for more than 1400 years - and now has more than 1.5 billion followers - cannot be sweepingly accused of being prone to violence. I would not argue that the new jihadists have nothing at all to do with Islam, but it would be just as false to present their extreme interpretation as the sole, true version of the faith, as many so-called critics of Islam are now doing.
Anyone who reads this book through to the end will understand that the target audience from whom the new jihadists do their recruiting is not 'Muslims'; it is a shrill but numerically tiny minority: the Salafists. The 'average Muslim' is as unreachable for the jihadists as the 'average German' is for violent neo Nazis.' (P5).
Elsewhere, he writes, 'It is hard to say to what degree... the overall philosophy of the Islamic State can be described as 'Islamic', because Sunni Islam has neither a Pope nor any other absolute authority who can rule on matters of belief. To assert that the Islamic State has nothing to do with Islam is well-intentioned but misleading. Its members consider themselves Muslims and draw on the same sources referred to by the majority of (non-extremist) Muslims...But for all that, it is wrong to lump together the Islam of the Islamic State with the Islam that is practised by hundreds of millions of (deeply observant) Muslims. Not only because there is no such thing as a single, supposedly 'true' Islam, but also because the Islamic State's interpretations are considered extreme even by the standards of the jihadist spectrum. If even al-Qaeda brands the Islamic State an apocalyptic sect, it is obvious just how far outside the theological mainstream the group is operating.' (P.69)
‘The milieu that will be in the forefront of the security service’s minds… is the Salafist counterculture. It is the social and ideological incubator for the jihadists who join al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. It can be found on- and offline, in universities, prisons, radical mosques, Islam seminars, community centres and town centres. In Europe, it now has tens of thousands of supporters – and gains more every day.
As in other countercultures, there are different groups and tendencies among the Salafists; not all lean towards violence, but for some it is the last stop before going over to outright terrorism. The security services’ task is to watch the supporters and understand how the scene works, who exercises influence within it and which members are dangerous or potentially violent. It is just as important for them to win over informants and deploy them so that the ‘dangerous’ among the Salafists lose influence within the counterculture itself. Repressive tactics directed against the scene as a whole strengthen the ‘dangerous’ position and are therefore usually not only ineffective, but also highly counterproductive.
The same applies to the 99 per cent of European Muslims who are not part of the Salafist scene. To harass or criminalize them on the basis of their religion is illegal and an enormous waste of time, money and resources, which would be better spent on dealing with Salafists.
Of course, deeply problematic views continue to exist within Muslim communities in Europe. Attitudes such as anti-Semitism, antipathy towards democracy and rejection of gender equality must be tackled, but that is down to civil society and politics, not to the security services and least of all to the police. Treating Muslims as potential terrorists and potential candidates for surveillance, which the FBI has done in the past, would do severe damage to our society and squander the opportunity to win them as partners.’ (pages 179/180)
‘Another essential element consists of cooperation with Muslim communities, because they represent the faith that the jihadists claim as their own and cite as their justification. In theory, non-Salafist Muslims provide a counterweight to extremism, embody religious diversity and can reach people to whom the state has no access. But in practice, this cooperation is often very difficult. That is partly because mainstream Muslim communities are just as helpless and clueless about Salafism as the rest of society. Their leaders tend to be old men with no insight into the realities of life for young Muslims and who would rather avoid the controversial questions about identity, drugs and sex that the Salafists actively address. Moreover, they are fed up of politicians and the media holding them responsible for the actions of a small minority and believe that the tone of the media’s reporting on Islam, the Islamic State and terrorism is fomenting a growing Islamaphobia.
This attitude is understandable, at least in part, but these mainstream communities and their associations are making a mistake if they avoid this subject, because extremism is ultimately a threat to them too, and to the millions of Muslims living peacefully in the West. A functioning prevention strategy will need Muslim communities to aggressively and credibly engage with extremists, and the state not to communicate with Muslim citizens only via Homeland Security and ‘security partnerships’, but to truly accept them as fellow citizens and offer them real participation in society.’ (pages 184/185)'
'...a religion which has existed for more than 1400 years - and now has more than 1.5 billion followers - cannot be sweepingly accused of being prone to violence. I would not argue that the new jihadists have nothing at all to do with Islam, but it would be just as false to present their extreme interpretation as the sole, true version of the faith, as many so-called critics of Islam are now doing.
Anyone who reads this book through to the end will understand that the target audience from whom the new jihadists do their recruiting is not 'Muslims'; it is a shrill but numerically tiny minority: the Salafists. The 'average Muslim' is as unreachable for the jihadists as the 'average German' is for violent neo Nazis.' (P5).
Elsewhere, he writes, 'It is hard to say to what degree... the overall philosophy of the Islamic State can be described as 'Islamic', because Sunni Islam has neither a Pope nor any other absolute authority who can rule on matters of belief. To assert that the Islamic State has nothing to do with Islam is well-intentioned but misleading. Its members consider themselves Muslims and draw on the same sources referred to by the majority of (non-extremist) Muslims...But for all that, it is wrong to lump together the Islam of the Islamic State with the Islam that is practised by hundreds of millions of (deeply observant) Muslims. Not only because there is no such thing as a single, supposedly 'true' Islam, but also because the Islamic State's interpretations are considered extreme even by the standards of the jihadist spectrum. If even al-Qaeda brands the Islamic State an apocalyptic sect, it is obvious just how far outside the theological mainstream the group is operating.' (P.69)
‘The milieu that will be in the forefront of the security service’s minds… is the Salafist counterculture. It is the social and ideological incubator for the jihadists who join al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. It can be found on- and offline, in universities, prisons, radical mosques, Islam seminars, community centres and town centres. In Europe, it now has tens of thousands of supporters – and gains more every day.
As in other countercultures, there are different groups and tendencies among the Salafists; not all lean towards violence, but for some it is the last stop before going over to outright terrorism. The security services’ task is to watch the supporters and understand how the scene works, who exercises influence within it and which members are dangerous or potentially violent. It is just as important for them to win over informants and deploy them so that the ‘dangerous’ among the Salafists lose influence within the counterculture itself. Repressive tactics directed against the scene as a whole strengthen the ‘dangerous’ position and are therefore usually not only ineffective, but also highly counterproductive.
The same applies to the 99 per cent of European Muslims who are not part of the Salafist scene. To harass or criminalize them on the basis of their religion is illegal and an enormous waste of time, money and resources, which would be better spent on dealing with Salafists.
Of course, deeply problematic views continue to exist within Muslim communities in Europe. Attitudes such as anti-Semitism, antipathy towards democracy and rejection of gender equality must be tackled, but that is down to civil society and politics, not to the security services and least of all to the police. Treating Muslims as potential terrorists and potential candidates for surveillance, which the FBI has done in the past, would do severe damage to our society and squander the opportunity to win them as partners.’ (pages 179/180)
‘Another essential element consists of cooperation with Muslim communities, because they represent the faith that the jihadists claim as their own and cite as their justification. In theory, non-Salafist Muslims provide a counterweight to extremism, embody religious diversity and can reach people to whom the state has no access. But in practice, this cooperation is often very difficult. That is partly because mainstream Muslim communities are just as helpless and clueless about Salafism as the rest of society. Their leaders tend to be old men with no insight into the realities of life for young Muslims and who would rather avoid the controversial questions about identity, drugs and sex that the Salafists actively address. Moreover, they are fed up of politicians and the media holding them responsible for the actions of a small minority and believe that the tone of the media’s reporting on Islam, the Islamic State and terrorism is fomenting a growing Islamaphobia.
This attitude is understandable, at least in part, but these mainstream communities and their associations are making a mistake if they avoid this subject, because extremism is ultimately a threat to them too, and to the millions of Muslims living peacefully in the West. A functioning prevention strategy will need Muslim communities to aggressively and credibly engage with extremists, and the state not to communicate with Muslim citizens only via Homeland Security and ‘security partnerships’, but to truly accept them as fellow citizens and offer them real participation in society.’ (pages 184/185)'