The news that the number of people that died in the Grenfell Tower Fire will likely rise above 100 is horrific and it is quite right that a public enquiry has been called - though this should run behind an inquest that gives the residents and victims families the ability to cross examine witnesses - that a public enquiry dies not. The Inquest identifies what happened and the public enquiry should identify how things can be improved.
I am not going to play a blame game now as it will become apparent that over time Labour, Coalition and Conservative governments, local authorities, the building industry as well as the Tower block owners will share little bits of whatever "blame" has to be passed around.
Such an enquiry will be made against a UK historical policy of "Passive" fire protection in which fire in a high rise block is contained in a room, flat or floor of a high rise building without it spreading to other floors or the whole building. That said, some fundamental questions have to be asked:
1. Why were Fire Safety assessments downgraded to " Self Assesments" in 2006? Also why did this move to self assesment not result in mandatory regular phyical fire safety inspections for all modifird high rise buildings and an appropriate level of random physical fire safety inspections for other buildings? By reducing most inspection to the review of a self assesment dicument for a building, without visiting the building, does not cut it for me I'm afraid.
2, The coroner for the 2009 Camberwell fire indicated in 2013 that fire and building regulations had to be reassessed, but this seems to have fallen down the cracks between the government and BRAC - the Building Regulations Advisory Committee a body run jointly by the Government and Local Authorities. Why was this not chased by a multitude of different bodies who knew of the coroner's findings?
3. Who on earth in the construction industry thought polyurethane blocks covered in aluminium sheets could be used to clad an existing high rise building? Even if saturated in fire resistant chemicals the polyurethane will burn at very high temperatures, worse. It could melt leaving the gap between the old concrete and metal outer cladding to act as a chimney to ferry the fire and heat up the building with the heat starting fires on other floors. At high enough temperatures Aluminium also burns which makes the heat more intense where the fire has already taken hold.
4. Is the use of a "Passive" fire protection policy for high rise building in the UK sufficient? Do sprinklers fire curtains and othef methods of fire protection need to be employed? Do high rise buildings need additional stairwells to provide a method of escape.
5. Public complaints about the safety of Grenfell Tower were clearly ignored by the owner and Local authority. How can this be improved and building owners forced to maintain a safe building? It is reported that power surges were a regular occurrence in Grenfell Tower. This is a major cause of fire in electrical appliances and equipment, yet they were seemingly ignored.