Grenfell Tower block disaster

[BlueAnorak]

Interesting points. Is it a case of manufacturers of cladding etc 'paying' for 'independant testing' and these results being relied on to OK the use of materials that turned out not to be suitable after all. Bit like oil companies commissioning climate change studies from 'independant scientists' who miraculously find no link between climate change and the burning of fossil fuels.

Nail on head. In this case it is called BCA (Building Control Alliance) that provide guidance documentation on building regulations for the Building industry.

 

[yeseye]

His expenses claims are scandalous

A man totally out of touch with his poorer residents in an era of so called AUSTERITY especially for councils and council tax payers

http://www.standard.co.uk/news/lond...voids-bash-at-his-family-estate-a3568101.html

https://www.rbkc.gov.uk/contactsdirectory/CllrPublicInfo.aspx?tab=4&seed=councillor rock feilding-mellen&key=4881

Can't even pay for his own football tickets.....he's loaded the ****

He sounds like a silver spoon ponce if ever there was one. He's toxic now, and good enough for the ****!
£60 lunches, im surprised he's not a big fat fucker! Has nobody told him about tescos £3 meal deal?

 

[BlueAnorak]

Did any regulations change in 2006 to allow this? The desk top exercise is ok if you're wanting to use material which has already been tested and approved - but not if components have changed. That's where the investigation will no doubt concentrate. Unless there is deliberate deception (like a garage giving a MoT cert for a duff car) it will just be moral guilt but nothing criminal.

All this will be academic (in literal and figurative senses) for future approvals. Regs will change and insurers will anyway insist on non-combustible cladding. On existing buildings with similar cladding it may be cheaper to retrofit sprinklers than replace cladding (though even with non-combustible materials, to inspect every joint has been correctly fitted is unrealistic as you would to remove it to check). That vastly reduces the risk but there's always the possibility of an external source - I'd ban Chinese lanterns as by Murphy's law one will land in a high rise balcony and cause a fire - and you'd need to know how sprinklers would cope with a flashover into an apartment. There are other things - in high rise, windows opening with a top hinge would deflect burning debris that mIght get in with side opening.

I still say Pickles was horribly complacent in 2013 and May was well out of order at PMQ this week blaming Blair. But complaceny has served politicians and developers well for a long time and the mantra "lessons will be learned" has proved to be nonsense in this case.

He was complacent but everyone has been for 30 years. Johnny Prescot and David Milliband are just as bad.

 

[mancityvstoke]

He sounds like a silver spoon ponce if ever there was one. He's toxic now, and good enough for the ****!
£60 lunches, im surprised he's not a big fat fucker! Has nobody told him about tescos £3 meal deal?

pigs in a trough all of them...cunts

 

[Vic]

His expenses claims are scandalous

A man totally out of touch with his poorer residents in an era of so called AUSTERITY especially for councils and council tax payers

http://www.standard.co.uk/news/lond...voids-bash-at-his-family-estate-a3568101.html

https://www.rbkc.gov.uk/contactsdirectory/CllrPublicInfo.aspx?tab=4&seed=councillor rock feilding-mellen&key=4881

Can't even pay for his own football tickets.....he's loaded the ****

I followed up his "interests". I thought his firm "socially conscious capital" sounded quite responsible. Then I got to this - the Grenfell residents' view of his projects (in July last year). Building on his own land in green belt! And likely to profit from his own policies on Kensington.

https://grenfellactiongroup.wordpress.com/tag/socially-conscious-capital/

 

[SilverFox2]

Local Government is the training ground for future MP's whichever party they aspire to.
Many left wing MP's are there as a result of local government training so it is hardly surprising it works just as well for the Conservatives.

However, when it comes to looking after themselves they can be single minded as the recent bill to enforce logging of internet browsing for a year passed only after they excluded themselves from this need.

 

[Vic]

What about the fire in Fife Scotland in 2000? That that Red Tory Johnny Prescott as Deputy PM had cabinet responsibility for?
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/201...-high-rise-building-cladding-ignored-decades/

Politicians should stop trying to throw shit at each other and get on with sorting out the multitude of cock-ups over decades layered one on top of another that resulted in this disaster.

Like you just did? So far as I can see, the government then did what the parliamentary report recommended (which now seems woefully inadequate). The difference is that this government seems not to have acted on the coroner's report (2013) after the Lakanal fire in 2009 (or it was taking a long time to effect any change).

The select committee after that fire (in Ayrshire actually) - having taken evidence, concluded that "The evidence we have received during this inquiry does not suggest that the majority of the external cladding systems currently in use in the UK poses a serious threat to life or property in the event of fire", and "We believe that all external cladding systems should be required either to be entirely non-combustible, or to be proven through full-scale testing not to pose an unacceptable level of risk in terms of fire spread." (Which, if I read it right, is what the new Regs in 2005 did - though in Scotland I think it had to be "non combustible".)

The relevant paragraphs are below . https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmenvtra/109/10907.htm

18. The evidence we have received during this inquiry does not suggest that the majority of the external cladding systems currently in use in the UK poses a serious threat to life or property in the event of fire. There have been few recorded incidents of serious fire spread involving external cladding, and, although in our view any loss of life in incidents such as these should be prevented if at all possible, neither have there been many deaths (indeed, it is uncertain whether any of the deaths in the fires of which we have been informed can be directly attributed to excessive fire spread via the external cladding). Furthermore, the responsible attitude taken by the major cladding manufacturers towards minimising the risks of excessive fire spread has been impressed upon us throughout this inquiry.

19. Notwithstanding what we have said in paragraph 18 above, we do not believe that it should take a serious fire in which many people are killed before all reasonable steps are taken towards minimising the risks. The evidence we have received strongly suggests that the small-scale tests which are currently used to determine the fire safety of external cladding systems are not fully effective in evaluating their performance in a 'live' fire situation. As a more appropriate test for external cladding systems now exists, we see no reason why it should not be used.

20. We believe that all external cladding systems should be required either to be entirely non-combustible, or to be proven through full-scale testing not to pose an unacceptable level of risk in terms of fire spread. We therefore recommend that compliance with the standards set in the 'Test for assessing the fire performance of external cladding systems', which has been submitted to the British Standards Institution for adoption as a British Standard, be substituted in Approved Document B for previous requirements relating to the fire safety of external cladding systems.


The next complacency will be to fit non-combustible cladding but reject sprinklers - until the next fire deaths where the fire spreads over the non-combustible walls, because that's what fire does.

 

[BlueAnorak]

Like you just did? So far as I can see, the government then did what the parliamentary report recommended (which now seems woefully inadequate). The difference is that this government seems not to have acted on the coroner's report (2013) after the Lakanal fire in 2009 (or it was taking a long time to effect any change).

The select committee after that fire (in Ayrshire actually) - having taken evidence, concluded that "The evidence we have received during this inquiry does not suggest that the majority of the external cladding systems currently in use in the UK poses a serious threat to life or property in the event of fire", and "We believe that all external cladding systems should be required either to be entirely non-combustible, or to be proven through full-scale testing not to pose an unacceptable level of risk in terms of fire spread." (Which, if I read it right, is what the new Regs in 2005 did - though in Scotland I think it had to be "non combustible".)

The relevant paragraphs are below . https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmenvtra/109/10907.htm

18. The evidence we have received during this inquiry does not suggest that the majority of the external cladding systems currently in use in the UK poses a serious threat to life or property in the event of fire. There have been few recorded incidents of serious fire spread involving external cladding, and, although in our view any loss of life in incidents such as these should be prevented if at all possible, neither have there been many deaths (indeed, it is uncertain whether any of the deaths in the fires of which we have been informed can be directly attributed to excessive fire spread via the external cladding). Furthermore, the responsible attitude taken by the major cladding manufacturers towards minimising the risks of excessive fire spread has been impressed upon us throughout this inquiry.

19. Notwithstanding what we have said in paragraph 18 above, we do not believe that it should take a serious fire in which many people are killed before all reasonable steps are taken towards minimising the risks. The evidence we have received strongly suggests that the small-scale tests which are currently used to determine the fire safety of external cladding systems are not fully effective in evaluating their performance in a 'live' fire situation. As a more appropriate test for external cladding systems now exists, we see no reason why it should not be used.

20. We believe that all external cladding systems should be required either to be entirely non-combustible, or to be proven through full-scale testing not to pose an unacceptable level of risk in terms of fire spread. We therefore recommend that compliance with the standards set in the 'Test for assessing the fire performance of external cladding systems', which has been submitted to the British Standards Institution for adoption as a British Standard, be substituted in Approved Document B for previous requirements relating to the fire safety of external cladding systems.


The next complacency will be to fit non-combustible cladding but reject sprinklers - until the next fire deaths where the fire spreads over the non-combustible walls, because that's what fire does.

I was actually giving counter-examples to the political blame game you were pointing at Pickles. And yes he has top take some blame, but so does the government that clearly buried the above report and watered down the regs further in 2006 by the introduction of 'desk-top' surveys.

31 years of Government both Labour and Conservative or Coalition has let it fester. It started with the Tory government normalising standards across the country in 1986 by not adopting the London Building Regulations (that meant the floors, interior walls and exterior wall of high rise buildings had to be "fire retardant" and not be of "limited combustibility" as per the applied general standards). Local authorities have also let it fester as the building regs are set by an NGO that local authorities have a huge input into.

Every couple of years a report like the one you highlight that sprinklers, fire curtains and multiple stairwells will save lives but nothing gets done. Why?

The original "Passive" fire protection in high rise developments worked fairly well for 40 till the mid 90's. But were they really good enough in a rich society? People still died in individual flat fires that shouldn't have and cladding introduced a whole new level of danger.

Never again. Lets stop throwing political stones as to who is to blame. All parties are. Let's just stop it from happening again.

 

[Vic]

I was actually giving counter-examples to the political blame game you were pointing at Pickles. And yes he has top take some blame, but so does the government that clearly buried the above report and watered down the regs further in 2006 by the introduction of 'desk-top' surveys.

31 years of Government both Labour and Conservative or Coalition has let it fester. It started with the Tory government normalising standards across the country in 1986 by not adopting the London Building Regulations (that meant the floors, interior walls and exterior wall of high rise buildings had to be "fire retardant" and not be of "limited combustibility" as per the applied general standards). Local authorities have also let it fester as the building regs are set by an NGO that local authorities have a huge input into.

Every couple of years a report like the one you highlight that sprinklers, fire curtains and multiple stairwells will save lives but nothing gets done. Why?

The original "Passive" fire protection in high rise developments worked fairly well for 40 till the mid 90's. But were they really good enough in a rich society? People still died in individual flat fires that shouldn't have and cladding introduced a whole new level of danger.

Never again. Lets stop throwing political stones as to who is to blame. All parties are. Let's just stop it from happening again.

That was my stance until May lied in PMQ about Blair and cladding and what the Regulatory Reform Order did. That infuriated me.

(Have you got a link to the idea that desk top study came in in 2006? Because as I read it the regs then tried to reflect the recommendations of the MPs' report.)

 

[BlueAnorak]

It was in the BBC report I posted on Monday.

 

[Vic]

It's your implication that the 2006 regs somehow weakened control that I'm challenging. They may have been inadequate but did they really make things worse?

Whether the BCA was effectively trying to find ways round the regs needs to be established but you can't deal with that without asking whether privatising building control (by allowing "independent" inspectors as an alternative to local authority inspection) was a good idea.

 

[gordondaviesmoustache]

He sounds like a silver spoon ponce if ever there was one. He's toxic now, and good enough for the ****!
£60 lunches, im surprised he's not a big fat fucker! Has nobody told him about tescos £3 meal deal?

All the sums claimed are for round figures. Doesn't he know the first rule of expense claims?!

 

[BlueAnorak]

It's your implication that the 2006 regs somehow weakened control that I'm challenging. They may have been inadequate but did they really make things worse?

Whether the BCA was effectively trying to find ways round the regs needs to be established but you can't deal with that without asking whether privatising building control (by allowing "independent" inspectors as an alternative to local authority inspection) was a good idea.

Fair enough.

The BBC Newsnight article on Monday:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40418266
Another BBC Newsnight article today:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40465399

The fire safety order of 2005 introduced in 2006 that led to the update in BCA guidence to include options 3 & 4
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/fire-safety-law-and-guidance-documents-for-business
When I have time I'll try and find the exact date when options 3 & 4 appeared in BCA guidance documents but it was certainly after 2000 and before 2010, They are always revisited after the publication of Fire Safety orders and Building Regulations. The last two years when guidance was changed was in 2010 and 2015

Building Control Alliance (BCA documentation):
http://buildingcontrolalliance.org/
Current guidance documents:
http://buildingcontrolalliance.org/guidance-documents/
The guidence on Cladding:
http://buildingcontrolalliance.org/...mbustible-cladding-materials-Rev-1-Jun-15.pdf
The critical guidance notes: Options 3 and 4 (that allow construction firms to drive a coach and horses through the fire regs

Where the building has a storey 18m or more above ground level , the BCA recommends four options for showing compliance with paragraph 12.7 of AD B2
Option 1
The use of materials of limited combustibility for all elements of the cladding system both above and below 18m. This includes the insulation, internal lining board and the external facing material. Smaller gasket parts and similar low-risk items can be excluded from this requirement. The definition of a MOLC is stated in Table A7 of AD B2.
Option 2
An acceptable alternative approach (see AD B2 paragraph 12.5) is for the client to submit evidence to the Building Control Body that the complete proposed external cladding system has been assessed according to the acceptance criteria in BR135 - Fire Performance of External Thermal Insulation for Walls of Multistorey Buildings. The preferred method of demonstrating compliance is via a fire test carried out in accordance with BS8414:1 Fire performance of external cladding systems – Part 1: Test method for non-loadbearing external cladding systems applied to the face of the building or BS8414-2 Fire performance of external cladding systems – Part 2: Test method for non-loadbearing external cladding systems fixed to and supported by a structural steel frame. The test should be carried out by an independent UKAS accredited testing body. The BS8414 tests do not give a PASS / FAIL answer because the data obtained is used by different bodies with different minimum requirements. Hence, for Building Regulation purposes, any test using this method needs to be supported with a Classification Report for the proposed specification confirming that the acceptance criteria of BR135 have been met. These acceptance criteria are listed in Annex A or Annex B of BR135 and include the following:  External fire spread—determined by a 600oC rise in temperature on the external face of the building (measured at a point approximately one storey above the fire floor) for thirty seconds or more during the initial fifteen minutes of the test.  Internal fire spread— determined by a 600oC rise in temperature on the internal face of the building (measured at a point approximately one storey above the fire floor) for thirty seconds or more during the initial fifteen minutes of the test.
Mechanical performance—determined by an assessment of system collapse, spalling, delamination, flaming debris or pool fires
Option 3
If no actual fire test data exists for a particular system, the client may instead submit a desktop study report from a
suitably qualified fire specialist stating whether, in their opinion, BR135 criteria would be met with the proposed
system. The report should be supported by test data from a suitable independent UKAS accredited testing body
(BRE, Chiltern Fire or Warrington Fire) and so this option may not be of benefit if the products have not already
been tested in multiple situations / arrangements. The report should also specifically reference the tests which
have been carried out on the product.
Option 4
If none of the above options are suitable, the client may consider addressing this issue via a holistic fire engineered
approach taking into account the building geometry, ignition risk, factors restricting fire spread etc. Such
an approach would be expected to follow a recognised design code such as the BS 7974 Application of fire safety
engineering principles to the design of buildings suite of documents and be supported with quantitative analyses
where appropriate.
Key Notes:
Surface Spread of Flame Classification does not infer any resistance to combustibility, it is solely a measure of the spread of a flame across the surface
Thermosetting insulants (rigid polyurethane foam boards) do not meet the limited combustibility requirements of AD B2 Table A7 and so should not be accepted as meeting AD B2 paragraph 12.7. However, if they are included as part of a cladding system being tested to BR135 & BS8414, the complete assembly may ultimately prove to be acceptable
The BR135 / BS8414 tests deal solely with the spread of fire once it has entered the cavity. Hence, the requirements for cavity barriers in accordance with Section 9 of AD B2 are required in all cases including around openings in the façade
Issues of the fire-resistance performance of external cladding systems, eg in relation to boundary conditions and space separation still need to be addressed. The recommendations in Section 13 of Approved Document B2 and BRE

All these words are nice in themselves but how did cladding installation and tiles meet fire regulations by following the above guidance?
For example, clearly Grenfell Tower had no Cavity barriers worth the name. Do other towers?

 

[franksinatra]

It's your implication that the 2006 regs somehow weakened control that I'm challenging. They may have been inadequate but did they really make things worse?

Whether the BCA was effectively trying to find ways round the regs needs to be established but you can't deal with that without asking whether privatising building control (by allowing "independent" inspectors as an alternative to local authority inspection) was a good idea.

You are quite correct it was never a good idea where regulations are enforced by organisations who's sole purpose is to make a profit.

It has led to a dumbing down of regulation enforcenent and a race to the bottom for construction standards. There are some decent Approved Inspectors but overall its resulted in less control and as the regulations are open to interpretation less scrupulous operators have led to a lowering of standards.

Thats only one element for me though. Product information, Data Sheets, BBA Certs are full of caveats, reference to other documents and consequently determing compliance is all the more difficult.

 

[BlueAnorak]

You are quite correct it was never a good idea where regulations are enforced by organisations who's sole purpose is to make a profit.

It has led to a dumbing down of regulation enforcenent and a race to the bottom for construction standards. There are some decent Approved Inspectors but overall its resulted in less control and as the regulations are open to interpretation less scrupulous operators have led to a lowering of standards.

Thats only one element for me though. Product information, Data Sheets, BBA Certs are full of caveats, reference to other documents and consequently determing compliance is all the more difficult.

Yep. a small mistake on a data sheet and it ripples through the entire process.
Garbage In - Garbage Out

The process is too complex. It has to be simple. The use of the phrase "Exterior Walls (including exterior cladding), Dwelling Separation Walls and floors must be Fire retardant" would be nice.

 

[franksinatra]

Yep. a small mistake on a data sheet and it ripples through the entire process.
Garbage In - Garbage Out

I think that will be the main thing which comes out of the enquiry and the ambiguity of the regulations. Sadly to aid business safety concessions have been made.

 

[Vic]

Fair enough.

The BBC Newsnight article on Monday:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40418266
Another BBC Newsnight article today:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40465399

The fire safety order of 2005 introduced in 2006 that led to the update in BCA guidence to include options 3 & 4
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/fire-safety-law-and-guidance-documents-for-business
When I have time I'll try and find the exact date when options 3 & 4 appeared but it was certainly before 2010,

Building Control Alliance (BCA documentation):
http://buildingcontrolalliance.org/
The guidance documents:
http://buildingcontrolalliance.org/guidance-documents/
The guidence on Cladding:
http://buildingcontrolalliance.org/...mbustible-cladding-materials-Rev-1-Jun-15.pdf
The critical guidance notes: Options 3 and 4 (that allow construction firms to drive a coach and horses through the fire regs


All these words are nice in themselves but how did cladding installation and tiles meet fire regulations by following the above guidance?
Clearly Grenfell Tower had no Cavity barriers worth the name. Do other towers?

Did Grenfell have no cavity barriers? The unburnt sections should allow investigators to check whether it was installed according to the regs. There's conjecture but nothing (so far as I know) to show that it was a factor. I keep repeating this but fIre will travel regardless of cladding - and it went down at Lakanal. Sprinklers are what's needed.

 

[franksinatra]

Did Grenfell have no cavity barriers? The unburnt sections should allow investigators to check whether it was installed according to the regs. There's conjecture but nothing (so far as I know) to show that it was a factor. I keep repeating this but fIre will travel regardless of cladding - and it went down at Lakanal. Sprinklers are what's needed.

Little information has been provided with regards cavity barriers. The panel in question also required a ventilated cavity so were the barriers not provided as a consequence or was an intumescent barrier used to expand when heated. Also if they were used did they react quick enough when flashover was reached and the flame elongated through the cavity?

 

[Vic]

All the sums claimed are for round figures. Doesn't he know the first rule of expense claims?!

They weren't expense claims. They were declarations of when someone else paid for his meal.

 

[BlueAnorak]

Did Grenfell have no cavity barriers? The unburnt sections should allow investigators to check whether it was installed according to the regs. There's conjecture but nothing (so far as I know) to show that it was a factor. I keep repeating this but fIre will travel regardless of cladding - and it went down at Lakanal. Sprinklers are what's needed.

Can't have had any that actually worked as the fire wasn't contained and spread across the outside of the building so quickly.

Sprinklers may have stopped the fire from starting, but once the cladding was alight they wouldn't have stopped or restricted It, unless they were on the outside. Dubai and Australia changed their fire regs to have outside sprinklers in light of major recent fires.