I had to go offline last night as my wife's ill at the moment (nothing unduly worrisome, thankfully) and needed some care and attention. Did you post the question? I haven't seen it, but if I've missed it, please flag it for me and I'll answer it as best I can.
As I understand it, the submission under article 47 essentially comprises largely the same information as is contained in the audited accounts, adjusted as necessary for FFP purposes. And the independent auditor is the same one who audits the club's annual accounts. On that basis, I've assumed that UEFA's allegations regarding the way sponsorships are dealt with in the documents submitted for FFP purposes would also entail the audited annual accounts not being true and fair.
Your reference to Note 4 as mentioned in the CAS Award is interesting. It actually suggests that it might have been possible for financial submissions to UEFA to be incorrect and incomplete, as was alleged, while the audited annual accounts remained true and fair. We can't analyse that further without knowing more about what note 4 contains, but it's a possibility I hadn't previously considered and it makes more sense of the position of some posters on here.
However, it doesn't make any difference to the issue of whether City's alleged conduct amounted to the club's directors potentially having committed the offence of false accounting. Under
section 17(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968, the offence is committed when someone falsifies "any account or any record or document made or required for any accounting purpose", and that seems clearly to me to include FFP submissions to UEFA.
It's also worth pointing out, not particularly in response to you but in view of many statements on here, that what constitutes conduct that's fraudulent in nature doesn't depend so much on what was done but on how and why it was done. If UEFA had characterised City's alleged breaches as having been committed unintentionally, possibly as a result of incorrect professional advice, there could be no allegation of false accounting.
Instead, they expressly stated that City dishonestly tried to conceal the club's true income, thereby deceiving UEFA into allowing the club to spend more money (to the tune of an annual £50 million) on player transfers and wages than the FFP rules allowed. It's the imputation dishonesty and intentional deception with a view to gain (not necessarily one's own) that's crucial in terms of making the allegations in effect ones entailing conduct that, if committed, amounted to a fraud-based criminal offence.
For another illustration, let's use the example of Al Jazira paying Mancini under a contract for services. There's no imputation of potentially criminal conduct if the contention is simply that City should have notified the Premier League of an arrangement between the club's manager and a related party owned by the major shareholder, but failed to do so owing to either an oversight or a misunderstanding of the rules.
On the other hand, if the contention is that the club deliberately concocted a scheme to pay Mancini extra salary off the books under a sham contract with a related party and intentionally concealed the arrangement, such conduct, too, seems to me to fall clearly within the definition of false accounting. Even if, for whatever reason, a prosecution would be unlikely to follow were the allegations to be borne out to the civil law standard of proof, that doesn't change the nature of the alleged conduct.
It's worth reminding ourselves of the PL's wording in its publicly declared statement of charges against City. In particular, I note that we're alleged, in respect of nine successive seasons ending in 2017/18, to have breached "
the Premier League Rules applicable in those seasons that required provision by a member club to the Premier League, in the utmost good faith, of accurate financial information that gives a true and fair view of the club’s financial position, in particular with respect to its revenue (including sponsorship revenue), its related parties and its operating costs".
I find it hard to see how, IF we were indeed guilty of that charge, City could have failed for almost a decade to provide "in the utmost good faith, ... accurate financial information that gives a true and fair view of the club’s financial position, in particular with respect to its revenue (including sponsorship revenue)" without conduct taking place that amounts to false accounting. Surely dishonesty and deception would have to be involved for there to be nine years of continual breaches of rules requiring us to provide information that "gives a true and fair view of the club's financial position", at least in relation to some matters (sponsorship income, for one, which is expressly referenced).
This is important because it has a bearing on the standard of proof to be applied. Under PL rules, the standard of proof to be applied by the PL's Panel is the balance of probabilities. In other words if they're going to find City guilty they need to be satisfied that the PL's charges are more likely than not to be true.
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However, as I've discussed earlier in this thread and as other lawyers have mentioned, there's a well established principle in English law, supported by an extensive body of relevant case law, that particularly cogent evidence is required to justify a finding of fraud or other discreditable conduct. As a matter of theory, this doesn't change the standard of proof from the balance of probabilities. However, in effect, many practitioners regard it as creating a higher bar in cases where such conduct is alleged.
This is, in my view, an important factor in City's favour. To the extent that the charges involve dishonesty, and thus more serious consequences should we be found guilty, the PL faces a far from an easy task in terms of substantiating its case to the necessary standard of proof. To the extent that the charges don't involve dishonesty and deception, one can reasonably infer that, even with a guilty finding, the more extreme kinds of punishment mooted in the media won't be justified.
It's also relevant to the issue of an appeal to the High Court. As others have said, one would expect the panel in a case like this to be utterly circumspect in terms of maintaining neutrality and conducting the proceedings fairly. For this reason, the lawyers on here have quite properly characterised as pretty minimal the likelihood of City being able to have recourse to the court system to appeal the eventual award.
Nonetheless, were the PL's Panel to fail to adhere to the requirement for particularly cogent evidence to substantiate a guilty finding on a matter involving dishonesty, that would be a point of law. This would potentially bring into play
section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996.
Under section 69(1), a party to arbitral proceedings has a general right to "appeal to the court on a question of law arising out of an award made in the proceedings". The leave of the court is required but, under section 69(3), such leave is to be given if "the determination of the question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties". In the hypothetical situation of the Panel ignoring the need for cogency, it would certainly have a substantial effect on City's rights.
Without knowing what evidence the PL has, I'm quite reluctant to make predictions. However, those on here who are worried about some kind of PL stitch-up might at least be comforted to know that, with regard to any really serious charges involving dishonesty and deception, we're not without legal safeguards.