Appreciate that.
And without having the same sort of experience either yourself or
@Saddleworth2 would have, I still have enough experience at business level in change management procedure through my operational and IT support roles through the years and business case budget approval in my latter years.
I suspected all along that it was as haphazard as you imply and also that although you probably think that was a huge bonus for the EU side, I think it was also a source of enormous frustration.
I think the Irish government tried to use very diplomatic language at all times, but not only was it causing frustration but perhaps mistrust also. Maybe that’s just my perception of it. I could be projecting that.
There will be problems as everyone including yourself are saying and there will be negotiations for years, I feel, but that’s diplomacy anyway.
There will be consequences though that I know you have considered worth your own vision of an end game. You’ve said so all along.
We can see it here already with measures being planned for by many companies to bypass Britain.
The same will happen on the continent I’m sure.
It is what it is and we will all get on with it.
Hard to judge anything at the moment with Covid. Wait until things get back to some semblance of normal.
TLDR: Only intended for the few posters interested in managing major change programmes – in the context of the Brexit referendum
Over the last couple of decades, in particular, the government has become aware of the impact that major projects and programmes failing causes – these impacts are reflected in timetable, costs, quality of public services and political embarrassment.
There has been an increasing and authoritative focus, under the control of the Cabinet Office, in ensuring that major projects and programmes are scrutinised by professionals acting for the CO, with processes for reporting into and coordinated by the CO being established. After many years of development this has resulted in:
“The Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) is the government’s centre of expertise for infrastructure and major projects, supporting the successful delivery of all types of major projects. The IPA sits at the heart of government, reporting to the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury.”
Within the IPA has been the establishment of:
“The Government Major Projects Portfolio (GMPP). The IPA and Her Majesty’s Treasury have the final decision on which projects and programmes join the Government Major Project Portfolio (GMPP). The IPA will be responsible for the tracking and monitoring of GMPP projects. The IPA will support GMPP projects with expert advice and support, intervening early to ensure that projects are set up for success.”
What should have happened was that, immediately following the 2015 election result, the CO’s IPA should have instructed all departments to establish Outline Business Cases and plans for leaving the EU – these would have led to the ‘Impact Assessments’ and been used to inform the referendum options. This was not approved by Cameron – anecdotally I hear because there was no desire to demonstrate that the UK could practically leave the EU – his focus was on it not progressing.
Once that gamble backfired and immediately following the referendum, then the CO’s IPA should have instructed all affected departments, e.g. HO, Defra, HMRC etc. to mobilise Programme Structures (i.e. workstreams within a PPM regime) and develop the programme planning that would have then led to the identification of the policies and actions required to implement the management of leaving the EU. Front and centre of this work should have been the development of TOMs for each department – I will refrain from going into detail about TOMs, but, simply, the production of TOMs would have ensured the necessary focus was provided that would have been required to identify the policies and activities needed to manage the transition from the current operational model to the new.
Simplistically, such policies and activities would have been brigaded into workstreams, within Programme Management structures, within each department and reported into and coordinated by the IPA’s GMPP.
Though the IPA GMPP, the CO would have ensured that the development of government policy was informed and funding secured.
That this was not commenced was a flagrant breach of duty and the decision was mainly Hammond’s – not wanting to actively plan for and fund the activities for Brexit to happen. My assumption is that this was because the intention/expectation was that Brexit would not happen – or if it did then, it would be only in such a BRINO fashion that there would be little change. It was only in the late Spring/Summer of 2018 that the CO was authorised/asked to start such fundamental work – far too late and then only half-heartedly because the May/Robbins/Hammond axis was still in charge.
There is simply no doubt that - had the government followed its own best practice in managing major change programmes - then indeed 100s (actually 1000s) of requirements and actions that would support the smoothing of exiting would have been identified, planned and undertaken.
This is a simple and undeniable fact – although I am not and never have said that exiting the EU would be some frictionless event.
This is why I have been very critical of the management of May/Robbins (I should have added Hammond) when leading for the UK on Brexit. Whether a Leaver or Remainer, we should all want what is best for the UK – and this highly unprofessional dereliction of duty by the UK government, which will certainly cause ‘avoidable levels’ of damage - I hold May/Robbins /Hammond directly responsible for.
This link to the IPA’s annual report will be of interest to only a very few:
IPA_AR_MajorProjects2019-20.pdf (publishing.service.gov.uk)
The report comments on Brexit on Page 30 – the scope of reviews mentioned and support given reflects that they started way too late and is trivial to what should have been undertaken.