737-8 max plane goes down (2018) - new not Max crash Indonesia

[Millwallawayveteran1988]

That’s a decent glass of wine and a beer every hour for six hours. With 17 hours to sleep it off, I’d venture he thought he’d be OK. His big mistake was getting dressed in his uniform and getting in the crew bus to the airport. Calling in sick (“unfit to fly”) would have been the thing to do. That and realizing what a serious lesson he had learned from the experience.

My only other thought is whether he was alone when he did this, or with other crew members, or perhaps even just trying to impress one female? I doubt he drank two bottles of wine and a pitcher of beer alone. If so, that screams of other issues.

He will be getting plenty of thinking time at HMP shortly.

 

[squirtyflower]

Two bottles of wine and a pitcher of beer is a normal match night isn’t it?



Or am I a pisshead in need of help?

 

[ChicagoBlue]

There is a genetic inability to metabolise alcohol among some Asians. I do find it slightly startling they could smell alcohol on him all that time later. Not surprised he failed the tests, but I am surprised he was noticeably smelling of it for that kind of volume - that's usually 6 hours later, not 12 or 13 (assuming he arrived early).

Usually arrive 1.5-2.0 hrs before international flight, so he should have had 15 hrs to metabolize after the last drink. At 0.01 per hr for the normal person, that would have made him pretty drunk at bedtime! If, as you say, he metabolized at a different rate, then who knows?!

Either way, he, or one of his crew, should have known BEFORE they left the hotel. One issue there, of course, is Japanese hierarchical culture. An American FO would have no problem thelling an American Captain that he smelled like he was “SICK” and should go back to bed and sleep it off. Not so much with some Asian crews. This was a secondary reason for the Asiana crash in SFO...no one was willing to speak up for fear of embarrassing someone else more superior and getting into trouble for it! When it comes to safety there is only ONE “superior” and that is SAFETY FIRST!

 

[ChicagoBlue]

He will be getting plenty of thinking time at HMP shortly.

I’m sure. However, the smarter punishment would be send him back to Japan for the Japanese to punish him. I’m pretty certain a japanese jail and the shame he has brought on himself and his family would be even more of a burden on him than any HMP Boarding House!

I just hope if this is a chronic personal problem, that he can also get professional treatment. To reach that level of the profession and be able to hide this behavior (if it wasn’t a one-off) takes complex strategies and skill to avoid detection.

 

[manchester blue]

Two bottles of wine and a pitcher of beer is a normal match night isn’t it?



Or am I a pisshead in need of help?

It's a Monday night in my house! I take it easy in the week.

 

[Trevor Morley's Tache]

AoA (Angle of Attack) probe may not have been working correctly from preliminary reports.

The AoA probe feeds the computers with the angle between the chord line and the ground; basically tells the computer if the aircraft is nose up or nose down. The angle of attack will have an effect on speed. Nose up creates drag, which slows the aircraft, and slowing the aircraft will cause a loss of height, unless engine power is increased.

If the probe is stuck, then pulling back on the stick will cause the computer to think the aircraft is actually nose down, and the computer will try to react, possibly decreasing the engine power.

 

[Millwallawayveteran1988]

https://www.google.co.uk/amp/s/www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/uk-46137445

Not much leeway on this one! less than 1000 ft to work with! Fuckin hell I’ll bet that was scary!

 

[ChicagoBlue]

AoA (Angle of Attack) probe may not have been working correctly from preliminary reports.

The AoA probe feeds the computers with the angle between the chord line and the ground; basically tells the computer if the aircraft is nose up or nose down. The angle of attack will have an effect on speed. Nose up creates drag, which slows the aircraft, and slowing the aircraft will cause a loss of height, unless engine power is increased.

If the probe is stuck, then pulling back on the stick will cause the computer to think the aircraft is actually nose down, and the computer will try to react, possibly decreasing the engine power.

Not really, but too much to unpack in there.

In short, most planes don’t have an AOA indication, but it is fed into the computers. If the input is wrong, that can cause the aircraft to think it is in a regime of flight it is not. In this case, it was trying to force the aircraft nose down, because it believed the aircraft was approaching a stall. As it tries this, the pilots can force the opposite input to try to stop it, but can run out of elevator control if they have what is called a “runaway stabilizer” pitching the aircraft down. Accordingly, there are STAB CUTOFF switches on the pedestal to the right of the throttles by the FO trim wheel. Had they trimmed opposite the runaway stab and used the switches, they could have flown the aircraft back to the airport. Sadly, in their struggle to understand and oppose what what happening, it appears they didn’t know exactly what the problem was or how to stop it and/or correct it once their initial fight against it proved somewhat unsuccessful, so the aircraft accelerated and descended to their death.

With hindsight, it is always easy to second guess what happened and why, and to inject rationality into what was an horrendous situation in a brand new aircraft with which they were both undfamiliar and facing a fault that almost never happens. So, in the cold harsh light of day, it can be said that an aircraft fault was exacerbated by incorrect inputs and actions by the crew. However, when something goes wrong on a flight deck, it is often something that is far from obvious, easy to identify, or requires a simple “turn it off,” because flying is such a dynamic activity. Everything is somehow connected to everything else. So many things are interconnected that sometimes even understanding what caused X to happen is a chain of events that was invisible to the crew and only indicated to them by a secondary or even tertiary event that they must correlate within seconds to correct. Not an easy thing!

Some people think an engine blowing up is the worst thing that could happen, because it is loud, violent, often makes the aircraft shake and is one of the two things keeping the aircraft in the air. However, I think most pilots would agree that it is the insidious faults, the ones that mask their primary failure, that are the ones we hate the most. In this instance, figuring out what was causing the problem was hard enough, but correcting the problem once it started was always going to be harder without an almost complete “turn it off and revert to manual everything,” because the inputs being received to the Primary Flight Displays and controls WERE the problem, but they just couldn’t get there quickly enough.

The FAA just issued an Emergency Pilot Bulletin for this aircraft accident, re-emphasizing the corrective actions for the multitude of messages and actions that MIGHT be caused by this anomaly. Sobering stuff!

 

[cleavers]

In this instance, figuring out what was causing the problem was hard enough, but correcting the problem once it started was always going to be harder without an almost complete “turn it off and revert to manual everything,” because the inputs being received to the Primary Flight Displays and controls WERE the problem, but they just couldn’t get there quickly enough.

From what you've posted earlier in the thread, do you think the training for these guys really gave them the option to turn everything off and revert to manual flying ? I assume the procedures are there to follow, but will they ever be actually trained/simulated ?

Are these sort of airlines able to give enough training (training time) in a new aircraft to do that ? That sounds quite a damning thing to say, but our own budget airlines are often considered a bit "sailing close to the wind", so in somewhere like Indonesia, where money is tighter, and fares far cheaper (I assume), will they be sailing too close to it ?

 

[Trevor Morley's Tache]

Not really, but too much to unpack in there.

In short, most planes don’t have an AOA indication, but it is fed into the computers. If the input is wrong, that can cause the aircraft to think it is in a regime of flight it is not. In this case, it was trying to force the aircraft nose down, because it believed the aircraft was approaching a stall. As it tries this, the pilots can force the opposite input to try to stop it, but can run out of elevator control if they have what is called a “runaway stabilizer” pitching the aircraft down. Accordingly, there are STAB CUTOFF switches on the pedestal to the right of the throttles by the FO trim wheel. Had they trimmed opposite the runaway stab and used the switches, they could have flown the aircraft back to the airport. Sadly, in their struggle to understand and oppose what what happening, it appears they didn’t know exactly what the problem was or how to stop it and/or correct it once their initial fight against it proved somewhat unsuccessful, so the aircraft accelerated and descended to their death.

With hindsight, it is always easy to second guess what happened and why, and to inject rationality into what was an horrendous situation in a brand new aircraft with which they were both undfamiliar and facing a fault that almost never happens. So, in the cold harsh light of day, it can be said that an aircraft fault was exacerbated by incorrect inputs and actions by the crew. However, when something goes wrong on a flight deck, it is often something that is far from obvious, easy to identify, or requires a simple “turn it off,” because flying is such a dynamic activity. Everything is somehow connected to everything else. So many things are interconnected that sometimes even understanding what caused X to happen is a chain of events that was invisible to the crew and only indicated to them by a secondary or even tertiary event that they must correlate within seconds to correct. Not an easy thing!

Some people think an engine blowing up is the worst thing that could happen, because it is loud, violent, often makes the aircraft shake and is one of the two things keeping the aircraft in the air. However, I think most pilots would agree that it is the insidious faults, the ones that mask their primary failure, that are the ones we hate the most. In this instance, figuring out what was causing the problem was hard enough, but correcting the problem once it started was always going to be harder without an almost complete “turn it off and revert to manual everything,” because the inputs being received to the Primary Flight Displays and controls WERE the problem, but they just couldn’t get there quickly enough.

The FAA just issued an Emergency Pilot Bulletin for this aircraft accident, re-emphasizing the corrective actions for the multitude of messages and actions that MIGHT be caused by this anomaly. Sobering stuff!

I was aware the AOA doesn't feed a cockpit display directly. You have a rate of climb indicator and AH to give you situational awareness in this instance, and the ADC does its magic in the background.

I guess the easiest issues to deal with in the cockpit are the ones you understand, such as loss of hydraulic pressure or an engine fire/failure. Anything that doesn't conform to normal fault behaviour such as contradictory indications can easily throw you into confusion. It must be really difficult to discount something, which for all intents and purposes shouldn't by lying to you. I guess this is a relatively modern problem where systems have backup on top of backup, and the probability of them failing is so low that we almost believe they are 100% fail safe.

As an engineer, I have time to work through faults methodically, and carry out a number of tests and checks to break down the fault and identify the cause. This isn't always the case in the air as it is fairly time critical when the ground is coming up to meet you at 8000ft per minute. This is one of the reasons why flight crew rightly get paid a lot more than I do.

 

[west didsblue]

AoA (Angle of Attack) probe may not have been working correctly from preliminary reports.

The AoA probe feeds the computers with the angle between the chord line and the ground; basically tells the computer if the aircraft is nose up or nose down. The angle of attack will have an effect on speed. Nose up creates drag, which slows the aircraft, and slowing the aircraft will cause a loss of height, unless engine power is increased.

If the probe is stuck, then pulling back on the stick will cause the computer to think the aircraft is actually nose down, and the computer will try to react, possibly decreasing the engine power.

Just being pedantic, but the AoA isn't the angle between the chord line and the ground. It's the angle between the chord line and the airflow.

 

[Trevor Morley's Tache]

Just being pedantic, but the AoA isn't the angle between the chord line and the ground. It's the angle between the chord line and the airflow.

Yes. They effectively give local AOA, and the actual AOA is derived from this.

 

[ChicagoBlue]

From what you've posted earlier in the thread, do you think the training for these guys really gave them the option to turn everything off and revert to manual flying ? I assume the procedures are there to follow, but will they ever be actually trained/simulated ?

Are these sort of airlines able to give enough training (training time) in a new aircraft to do that ? That sounds quite a damning thing to say, but our own budget airlines are often considered a bit "sailing close to the wind", so in somewhere like Indonesia, where money is tighter, and fares far cheaper (I assume), will they be sailing too close to it ?

In this instance, the thing to turn off was the STAB TRIM (Stabilizer Trim) and revert to manual use. A Boeing Bulletin came out to that effect two days ago.

 

[ChicagoBlue]

Just being pedantic, but the AoA isn't the angle between the chord line and the ground. It's the angle between the chord line and the airflow.

It’s actually called “relative wind,” as opposed to airflow.

Some people don’t understand that you can have a high AOA and still be going down, because the relative wind is the important part. The Air France FO had this issue. He didn’t believe they could be stalled AND accelerating AND descending rapidly. If he had simply pushed his side stick controller forward, he would have solved their major problem...being in an accelerated stall!

 

[ChicagoBlue]

I was aware the AOA doesn't feed a cockpit display directly. You have a rate of climb indicator and AH to give you situational awareness in this instance, and the ADC does its magic in the background.

I think you are inferring things that are not true. It is more complicated than that. Yes, the ADC does it’s work in the background, but it’s OUTPUT is what you have to assess. When the aircraft isn’t doing what you think it should be doing, you address it knowing what you know. When you are going downhill and accelerating, you KNOW how to address that issue IF you have not approached a stall. In this instance, the AIRPLANE believed it was approaching a stall, so return the aircraft to stasis, it used the stab trim to put the nose down. Unfortunately, that was not the correct position for this aircraft, which meant the crew then had to trim against it....basically fighting the aircraft. In that case, knowing you are fighting the aircraft, you have to stop the aircraft from doing what it is doing TO YOU...which was to disconnect the STAB TRIM.

I guess the easiest issues to deal with in the cockpit are the ones you understand, such as loss of hydraulic pressure or an engine fire/failure. Anything that doesn't conform to normal fault behaviour such as contradictory indications can easily throw you into confusion. It must be really difficult to discount something, which for all intents and purposes shouldn't by lying to you. I guess this is a relatively modern problem where systems have backup on top of backup, and the probability of them failing is so low that we almost believe they are 100% fail safe.

When the aircraft automation is fighting you, you look, think and, usually, disconnect it! In this instance, it was autopilot OFF, autothrottles OFF, STAB TRIM SWX OFF....and fly the aircraft manually, with manual trim inputs to return the aircraft to stable flight.

As an engineer, I have time to work through faults methodically, and carry out a number of tests and checks to break down the fault and identify the cause. This isn't always the case in the air as it is fairly time critical when the ground is coming up to meet you at 8000ft per minute. This is one of the reasons why flight crew rightly get paid a lot more than I do.

Thank you. “Hours of boredom punctuated by moments of terror” as they say! As I tell people when they ask why pilots get paid so much, I tell them that we don’t necessarily get paid for the run of the mill things we do every day, we get paid for what we CAN DO, when needed, to save hundreds of lives, save hundreds of millions in equipment and save billions in liability.

 

[west didsblue]

It’s actually called “relative wind,” as opposed to airflow.

Some people don’t understand that you can have a high AOA and still be going down, because the relative wind is the important part. The Air France FO had this issue. He didn’t believe they could be stalled AND accelerating AND descending rapidly. If he had simply pushed his side stick controller forward, he would have solved their major problem...being in an accelerated stall!

I know. We had a very close interest in the cause of that accident as I was working on the Air Data System design on a new aircraft at the time.

 

[Trevor Morley's Tache]

I think you are inferring things that are not true. It is more complicated than that. Yes, the ADC does it’s work in the background, but it’s OUTPUT is what you have to assess. When the aircraft isn’t doing what you think it should be doing, you address it knowing what you know. When you are going downhill and accelerating, you KNOW how to address that issue IF you have not approached a stall. In this instance, the AIRPLANE believed it was approaching a stall, so return the aircraft to stasis, it used the stab trim to put the nose down. Unfortunately, that was not the correct position for this aircraft, which meant the crew then had to trim against it....basically fighting the aircraft. In that case, knowing you are fighting the aircraft, you have to stop the aircraft from doing what it is doing TO YOU...which was to disconnect the STAB TRIM.

When the aircraft automation is fighting you, you look, think and, usually, disconnect it! In this instance, it was autopilot OFF, autothrottles OFF, STAB TRIM SWX OFF....and fly the aircraft manually, with manual trim inputs to return the aircraft to stable flight.


Thank you. “Hours of boredom punctuated by moments of terror” as they say! As I tell people when they ask why pilots get paid so much, I tell them that we don’t necessarily get paid for the run of the mill things we do every day, we get paid for what we CAN DO, when needed, to save hundreds of lives, save hundreds of millions in equipment and save billions in liability.

Apologies. I wasn't inferring anything; more generalising. I totally appreciate just how complicated modern autopilot systems are.

I have worked large aircraft, but I have more experience with rotary. I've had some pretty hairy experiences during flight tests and transit flights. Fuel computer trims in the hover at 100ft when you have 20% authority over the throttle on a single potentiometer, where you can easily loose 50ft with 1/8th of a turn with a screwdriver are interesting to say the least.

I really respect pilots. I've flown many times from LHR to LAX. You guys have about 20 minutes of "excitement" each flight, and about 11 hours of staring at the sky. It might be exciting the first few times you do it, but after a while it must get pretty boring. After your normal flight routine, the only excitement you get it when you hit some turbulence and you have to switch the seatbelt sign on ;-)

 

[Millwallawayveteran1988]

It’s actually called “relative wind,” as opposed to airflow.

Some people don’t understand that you can have a high AOA and still be going down, because the relative wind is the important part. The Air France FO had this issue. He didn’t believe they could be stalled AND accelerating AND descending rapidly. If he had simply pushed his side stick controller forward, he would have solved their major problem...being in an accelerated stall!

Just out of interest, had he managed to get out of the stall, how would they have managed the rest of the flight with blocked Pitot tubes? Is it perfectly possible to do this?

 

[west didsblue]

Just out of interest, had he managed to get out of the stall, how would they have managed the rest of the flight with blocked Pitot tubes? Is it perfectly possible to do this?

On the Air France aircraft, the ice in the pitot tubes had long since cleared and at the time of the crash every system was working as it should. The pitots were only iced up for a short period of time, but the F/O carried on disbelieving his instruments and warnings when they were providing the correct information. If he had let go of his side stick even a few seconds earlier the aircraft could have recovered and it wouldn’t have crashed.

 

[basokla]

ChicagoBlue,

Quick question I think...

In a former life the company I worked for a company that had a private plane that we would use to visit customers. The pilot was our VP of Sales that had something like 20,000 hours of flight time with a major American commercial carrier. Since the “national” accounts were my responsibility I would travel with him alone on the plane quite frequently.

Several times he let me take the yoke and fly the plane. It was always after we reached cruising altitude and before we would begin our decent.

The company we worked for supplied GPS for small aircraft so I was somewhat knowledgeable on the general flight indicators.

My question...

Was what he did illegal?