I was asked to respond to the latest discussion against my self imposed ban on this limitation question. I do so because I have moved from my original position and the position that most lawyers on here seem to agree with. I was wrong, I think, to consider it so simply and think the focus on the overarching English law qualification of the Premier League rules may not offer the whole answer.
On reflection, I think the key here is that this is a disciplinary case under Section W. So whilst it is all governed by English law, disciplinary processes are seen differently from dispute resolution (Section X). That is usually because discipline, as in any industry, is seen as an important public confidence issue and professional wrong doing should not be allowed simply because of the passage of time.
However, this is complicated in the City case because the underlying allegations are, we think, related to matters that would ordinarily be fraud, accounting issues, financial non-compliance etc that is not merely sporting discipline. Those matters are usually non-arbitrable. These matters may fall outside the Premier League's contractual disciplinary jurisdiction entirely. You cannot prosecute fraud through a sports tribunal and avoid limitation by calling it "discipline." If the charges require proving effective criminal dishonesty, they are fraud allegations regardless of the label, and limitation should apply, six years from when the Premier League discovered (or should have discovered) the fraud.
City may have argued that the Premier League lacked jurisdiction to determine fraud allegations at all and that such matters should be in the courts where limitation, proper evidence rules, and processes apply. Whether anyone ran this argument, we do not know - City may have accepted jurisdiction. It seems that if City did accept jurisdiction, limitation is not in play. Very old allegations or weak cases could be dismissed for abuse of process but this requires the accused to show real prejudice, all unlikely here.
As I have previously said, I always felt it probably irrelevant either way, be it due to:
1) the fact that time barring could only ever, even in court, apply once all the evidence had already been heard anyway (at which point you have either brought the judge/panel with you or they are going the other way) or
2) because if the panel found against City on most of the key charges, they would have to have been deliberately concealed.
So, either way limitation would not be a bar.
Assuming City did not challenge the PLs Section W jurisdiction at this stage (perhaps leaving it for an appeal, though much harder if they never ran the argument at all), then the disciplinary proceedings probably continued treating these as regulatory breaches under Section W where no limitation periods apply. The panel will determine whether City breached the rules and ignore limitation as that question does not arise in their Section W framework.
If City lose and want to argue on appeal that the charges were actually fraud allegations outside the PL's jurisdiction, they face the problem that by participating without protest they may have accepted jurisdiction. An appeal will be reluctant to let parties submit to a process, lose, then challenge jurisdiction afterwards. The time to fight jurisdiction is at the start, not after an adverse decision. If City reserved their position explicitly throughout, an appeal might succeed on jurisdictional grounds, but if they treated it as straightforward regulatory discipline, that ship has likely sailed.
