Trevor Morley's Tache
Well-Known Member
This incident appears to be pretty much the classic swiss cheese model.The big crux of the situation is, can Boeing disprove that part of the safety certification criteria (CS25-1509) which is "No single failure should be attributable to a Hazardous or above (Catastrophic) failure". that this accident is found as the root cause. ie, the AoA vain failure (singular) did not have the correct level of redundancy or safety features to prevent the loss of the aircraft.
The cross check and alert of mismatch data from the AoA is only an "Optional extra" SAFETY feature on the Max, thus rendering the pilots unaware that a safety system "MCAS" is in action to correct the A/C handling due to bad data error it recieves from the faulty AoA.
The lack of training for the crew how to deal with a runaway MCAS
The understated declaration of the rate of pitch down change the MCAS performs to the FAA to prevent full certification qualification is unforgivable and potentially criminal in itself.
This is where Grandfather certification rules need to be very closely reviewed for future updates to old airframe designs.
With all the clever people that work in the aviation industry, we've still managed to end up in the situation where a single component failure can lead to the catastrophic loss of an aircraft.
The desire for increased functionality and automation gives rise to added complexity in design and engineering, looking for more and more innovative ways to solve problems that often don't need solving in the first place.