Ethiopian airline crash

The big crux of the situation is, can Boeing disprove that part of the safety certification criteria (CS25-1509) which is "No single failure should be attributable to a Hazardous or above (Catastrophic) failure". that this accident is found as the root cause. ie, the AoA vain failure (singular) did not have the correct level of redundancy or safety features to prevent the loss of the aircraft.

The cross check and alert of mismatch data from the AoA is only an "Optional extra" SAFETY feature on the Max, thus rendering the pilots unaware that a safety system "MCAS" is in action to correct the A/C handling due to bad data error it recieves from the faulty AoA.

The lack of training for the crew how to deal with a runaway MCAS

The understated declaration of the rate of pitch down change the MCAS performs to the FAA to prevent full certification qualification is unforgivable and potentially criminal in itself.

This is where Grandfather certification rules need to be very closely reviewed for future updates to old airframe designs.
This incident appears to be pretty much the classic swiss cheese model.

With all the clever people that work in the aviation industry, we've still managed to end up in the situation where a single component failure can lead to the catastrophic loss of an aircraft.

The desire for increased functionality and automation gives rise to added complexity in design and engineering, looking for more and more innovative ways to solve problems that often don't need solving in the first place.
 
This incident appears to be pretty much the classic swiss cheese model.

With all the clever people that work in the aviation industry, we've still managed to end up in the situation where a single component failure can lead to the catastrophic loss of an aircraft.

The desire for increased functionality and automation gives rise to added complexity in design and engineering, looking for more and more innovative ways to solve problems that often don't need solving in the first place.

Boeing's problem here though was that they absolutely did need to solve the problem, or the aircraft wouldn't have received certification.
 
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Had either of these crashes occurred in the US, I can’t imagine the level of the shitstorm that would be underway now, but it would make this rather large one pale in comparison!
Do you think that had these accidents happened in the US, that they may have been covered up to an extent ? Given that the FAA approved the certification of the aircraft built by Boeing. Maybe its a positive that they didn't, but your account from a user point of view is very worrying.

Not saying this one is Trump's fault but part of the blame falls into his mantra of deregulation at any cost.
Its not his fault as these aircraft predate him as president, the first may only have gone into service in 2016, but the process began in 2011, but I agree with the sentiment about cutting regulation.

Its going to take some pull back from Boeing this, I see Garuda have sent a letter asking to cancel their order of 49 aircraft, I'm sure others will follow suit.
 
I see Garuda have sent a letter asking to cancel their order of 49 aircraft, I'm sure others will follow suit.
Christ, if Garuda are worried about it, that says something, they used to have an abysmal safety record and I believe were banned from UK airspace for a while, maybe still are?
 
Christ, if Garuda are worried about it, that says something, they used to have an abysmal safety record and I believe were banned from UK airspace for a while, maybe still are?

To be fair, they're vastly improved and have focused on their procedures and safety very heavily the last few years. But it was true of them, for sure. But put it this way, when I'm travelling in Indonesia, Garuda are the only ones I'll fly.
 
Boeing's problem here though was that they absolutely did need to solve the problem, or the aircraft wouldn't have received certification.
In this case, it certainly was Boeing's problem, but I was talking more generically about aircraft design and the desire to innovate, and solve problems that aren't really problems.

You could argue systems like auto-land was a problem that didn't need solving, but the industry went ahead and developed it anyway.
 
Do you think that had these accidents happened in the US, that they may have been covered up to an extent ? Given that the FAA approved the certification of the aircraft built by Boeing. Maybe its a positive that they didn't, but your account from a user point of view is very worrying.

Tbh, I think almost any “third world” crash in well known, well-liked aircraft model is often assumed to be pilot error. Sad (or arrogant) as that sounds, I think people believe that “first world” aviation is better from a pilot training and maintenance perspective.

The first crash would, of course, been massive news and would have had a similar response, due to the aircraft being new...”What’s wrong with this new aircraft?”

The second crash, in almost identical circumstances may have set off even louder alarm bells!

However, I understand your point about the investigation, and that should concern everyone!

Thankfully, in the US, the regulator (FAA) DOES NOT investigate accidents. That is the NTSB. BUT, the pressure brought to bear on them by Boeing and the FAA is something we should all understand and should also be of concern.

I like that the Ethiopian black boxes have gone to France. That will help maintain the integrity of the investigation. Typing that gives me no pleasure, but with the level of corporate money, and the reputation of the FAA, at stake, I am honestly not sure there would not have been at least an attempt to cover up some of the institutional errors...at the very least!

On a more personal note, I am not afraid to fly the MAX, as I believe the STAB TRIM CUTOFF switches fix this problem. However, strapping on a jet that you know had a design flaw that might try to kill you should NEVER be the starting point of a flight.

My airline has scoured the 300,000 hours of MAX flight data they have and has not seen a single activation of the system. While past performance is not a predictor of future success, it appears clear to me that had we had an aircraft with a faulty AOA vane, that single channel failure would have activated MCAS. Where that would have led????

Before Lion Air, I honestly don’t know if it would have been survivable because I don’t know (still to this day!) how the system presents itself to you. I don’t know what happens to the displays, I don’t know what visual and aural warnings are present, and I don’t know what the effects of continuous 2.5 degree nose down trim has on the glyability of the aircraft because I don’t know how much nose down trim we can overcome with the yoke.

What I DO KNOW NOW is that any “automatic, opposite trim” that a MAX would have tried to deploy AGAINST PILOT INPUTS would have IMMEDIATELY led to using the cutoff switches. No ifs, ands or buts. We are trained to use them in a “runaway trim” situation, and MCAS is much more insidious than that, because it isn’t a trim FAULT, it is acting as programmed...2.5, then another 2.5, then another 2.5...but especially TODAY, post-Lion Air, they’re front and center in every 737 pilots mind!
 
Thanks CB, your input, with your professional point of views is a very interesting read.

I'm guessing that this won't be an expensive fix, especially as not many have been delivered yet, but it could be very costly in terms of lost or potentially lost orders.
 
I may sound a bit simple here but, why would a "safety " system be installed with obvious override systems. In my industry, to override a safety system requires many levels of approval. On the case of this plane it appears it is down to switching it off when the shit had already hit the fan. Something very badly wrong here in my opinion.
 
I may sound a bit simple here but, why would a "safety " system be installed with obvious override systems. In my industry, to override a safety system requires many levels of approval. On the case of this plane it appears it is down to switching it off when the shit had already hit the fan. Something very badly wrong here in my opinion.

If you switch it off and the pilots know about the issue they can fly the aircraft very easily. It's not a safety issue in that sense.
 

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