I wouldn't normally resurrect a post this far back in a thread, but this is a crucial issue in terms of how the allegations against City will be disposed of. It's important to ensure that the thread correctly states the lagal position because most users of this forum won't have first-hand knowledge of the relevant matters and rely on what others with ostensibly greater knowledge have posted. In view of this, I'd be grateful if you could cite a source for your unyielding statement above.
My own view of the situation has always been somewhat different. I believe that the PL's allegations are subject to a six-year limitation period from the cause of action (section 5 of the Limitation Act 1980). However, where a claim is based on matters allegedly entailing fraud or concealment on the part of a defendant, the six-year period runs not from the cause of action but from when the claimant discovers the fraud or concealment.
This is because the PL Rules are expressly stated to be subject to English law and they operate as a contract between each individual member club and the other member clubs as well as between each individual member club and the PL itself. Thus, the nature of the proceedings between the PL and Manchester City is such that they're subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act 1980, the statute that governs prescriptive periods for bringing legal actions across a range of civil-law matters in England and Wales (not the whole UK).
The provisions of the 1980 Act that are relevant to contractual affairs between the PL and MCFC are sections 5 and 32, referred to above. In addition, section 8 of the 1980 Act stipulates a 12-year limitation period for certain contracts but has no relevance to City's case.
The 1980 Act and other pieces of legislation do provide that a court has the right to disapply the limitation period in specific categories of cases. Examples are cases involving personal injury and defamation (both by virtue of specific provisions of the 1980 Act itself), claims against public authorities based on human rights considerations (by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998) and equal pay or discrimination-based claims (by virtue of the Equalities Act 2010). There are various others, too.
I'm aware of - and can find - nothing, however, that creates such a discretion in a case such as City's. If I'm missing something obvious, please enlighten me.