Russia interference Report

Why are you of the opinion that this report was written by some extension of the 'remain' campaign?

What evidence do you have for it?
Straight away in this thread we can see how the 'Russian interference' has worked. They didn't actually seek to influence the outcome of referenda or elections, they just sought to polarise debate and divide our society. The fact that at the first sniff of this report we've all jumped into our leave vs remain bunkers is exactly what the Russian social media engineering set out to do (according to the report).
 
Straight away in this thread we can see how the 'Russian interference' has worked. They didn't actually seek to influence the outcome of referenda or elections, they just sought to polarise debate and divide our society. The fact that at the first sniff of this report we've all jumped into our leave vs remain bunkers is exactly what the Russian social media engineering set out to do (according to the report).
It is classic conspiracy theory knobheadery.
 
For those that are interested. Here are the findings on Russian interference on the referendum (apologies for the formatting).

Case study: the EU referendum

39. There have been widespread public allegations that Russia sought to influence the2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. The impact of any such attempts would be difficult – if not impossible – to assess, and we have not sought to do so. However,it is important to establish whether a hostile state took deliberate action with the aim of influencing a UK democratic process, irrespective of whether it was successful or not.

40. Open source studies have pointed to the preponderance of pro-Brexit or anti-EUstories on RT and Sputnik, and the use of ‘bots’ and ‘trolls’, as evidence of Russian attempts to influence the process.
We have sought to establish whether there is secret intelligence which supported or built on these studies. In response to our request for written evidence at the outset of the Inquiry, MI5 initially provided just six lines of text. It stated that ***, before referring to academic studies. This was noteworthy in terms of the way it was couched(***) and the reference to open source studies ***. The brevity was also, to us, again
indicative of the extreme caution amongst the intelligence and security Agencies at the thought that they might have any role in relation to the UK’s democratic processes, and particularly one as contentious as the EU referendum. We repeat that this attitude is illogical;this is about the protection of the process and mechanism from hostile state interference,which should fall to our intelligence and security Agencies.

(i) Failure to prepare
41. There has been credible open source commentary suggesting that Russia undertook influence campaigns in relation to the Scottish independence referendum in 2014. However, at the time ***. It appears that *** what some commentators have described as potentially the first post-Soviet Russian interference in a Western democratic process. We note that – almost five years on – ***.

42. It was only when Russia completed a ‘hack and leak’ operation against theDemocratic National Committee in the US – with the stolen emails being made public amonth after the EU referendum – that it appears that the Government belatedly realised the level of threat which Russia could pose in this area, given that the risk thresholds in theKremlin had clearly shifted, describing the US ‘hack and leak’ as a “game changer ”, and admitting that “prior to what we saw in the States,[Russian interference] wasn’t generally understood as a big threat to [electoral] processes”.

43. It appears that the Intelligence Community did learn lessons from the US experience,and HMG recognised the Russian threat to the UK’s democratic processes and political discourse. In May 2017, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) concluded that “ ***” and that “***”. Had the relevant parts of the Intelligence Community conducted a similar threat assessment prior to the referendum, it is inconceivable that they would not have reached the same conclusion as to Russian intent, which might then have led them to take action to protect the process.

(ii) Narrow coverage
44. The written evidence provided to us appeared to suggest that HMG had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes or any activity that has had a material impact on an election, for example influencing results. ***. ***.

45. This focus on *** indicates that open source material (for example, the studies of attempts to influence the referendum using RT and Sputnik, or social media campaigns referred to earlier) was not fully taken into account. Given that the Committee has previously been informed that open source material is now fully represented in the Government’s understanding of the threat picture, it was surprising to us that in this instance it was not.
46. Whilst it may be true that some issues highlighted in open source did not require the secret investigative capabilities of the intelligence and security Agencies or were at the periphery of their remits, the Agencies nonetheless have capabilities which allow them to ‘stand on the shoulders’ of open source coverage: for example, GCHQ might attempt to look behind the suspicious social media accounts which open source analysis has identified to uncover their true operators (and even disrupt their use), or SIS might specifically task an agent to provide information on the extent and nature of any Russian influence campaigns.However, we have found *** which suggests that ***. ***.

(iii)Lack of retrospective assessment
47. We have not been provided with any post-referendum assessment of Russian attempts at interference, ***. This situation is in stark contrast to the US handling of allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, where an intelligence community assessment was produced within two months of the vote, with an unclassified summary being made public. Whilst the issues at stake in the EU referendum campaign are less clear-cut, it is nonetheless the Committee’s view that the UK Intelligence Community should produce an analogous assessment of potential Russian interference in the EU referendum and that an unclassified summary of it be published.
48. ***. Even if the conclusion of any such assessment were that there was minimal interference, this would nonetheless represent a helpful reassurance to the public that the UK’s democratic processes had remained relatively safe.
 
A spy register? Fucking ha ha ha ha ha - how's that supposed to work??? Fucking joke.
Sadly the brainwashed masses will fall for it , Johnson and Cummings have got them where they want them , drip feeding complete bollocks which they suck up like a sponge. After the eye test fiasco everything now goes for these fucking liars .
 
Sadly the brainwashed masses will fall for it , Johnson and Cummings have got them where they want them , drip feeding complete bollocks which they suck up like a sponge. After the eye test fiasco everything now goes for these fucking liars .

You can go on the Mark ne Francios pas thread and cast your vote Sergei...........remember the code " the cow flies east for winter but the duck bathes in orange sauce"
 

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