Is Mancini adapting his Inter tactics? [Tactics talk]

[Breaker]

you'd have been laughed off the board if you said this 12 months ago! And yesterday we played with a back 4 that were at Hughes' disposal when he was running the team, not even 'Mancini's men'. Reason alone that Mancini is the superior manager. He may not be a brilliant 'man manager' but the players play their balls off for him, which is enough man management for me.

Exactly, all those games last year we lost/drew in the last 15 minutes will not happen this year under Mancini.

I dunno about that, most of our losses under Mancini have come in the last 15 minutes, Stoke/Scum x2/Spuds/Sunderland come to mind..probably comes from inviting pressure so much near the end of games when the score is level.

 

[redmizzle]

Exactly, all those games last year we lost/drew in the last 15 minutes will not happen this year under Mancini.

I dunno about that, most of our losses under Mancini have come in the last 15 minutes, Stoke/Scum x2/Spuds/Sunderland come to mind..probably comes from inviting pressure so much near the end of games when the score is level.

I think you have to consider the fact that in those games you mention bar Sunderland which we lost due to an individual error from Richards, Mancini was playing with an inherited squad. Clearly this is not the case now. Boateng and Kolarov will certainly be vital.

 

[the--dud]

Time for an update, here's my fivepenneth...

Yesterday was an interesting game for many reasons.

High profile games often are tight and extremely tactical. They are also subject to closer tactical analysis by the media. Chelsea's formation is familiar to the pundits. The two managers being former adversaries, and the stereotypical view of the Italian as 'tactician', only added to the interest. So it's no surprise that much of the credit for the win was laid upon the manager, even at the expense of the players, some of whom delivered really outstanding displays. Even VK, who excelled in every regard, talked as if City 'having a plan' was the crucial factor. Or, maybe that's just the way his comments were edited... either way, you get the point. Mancini must feel pretty satisfied this morning.

It provided examples of a few things we've talked about in this thread:

1) 'Weak' flanks vs 'Strong' flanks.

Look at that diagram, is it any wonder that City's better attacks came down the left hand side? Milner, Tevez, Silva and Zabaleta targeted Ivanovich. This is because there is a huge gap between him, and his team mate on the right, Anelka. There is also no obvious midfielder assigned to help him out. Mikkel is covering the CB's. Ramires is on the left *which surprises me*, and Essien was asked to play a Lampard esq attacking role... that's something I'll come back to.

In the first half, city lined up with Yaya stayed deep inside the midfield, with Silva on the right. Neither had eye catching halves. Yet they did a good job, because Silva's presence prevented Cole from attacking, Yaya's towering strength contributed to crushing Ramires's confidence. Their presence also contributed to preventing Malouda from isolating Boyata. Boyata was extremely well supported by Kolo Toure, who was freed up to help him by NDJ, who was freed up by Yaya.... the 20 year old played with grit and confidence and delivered several tough challenges.

2) 'Phases' and adaptability.

I believe, in these 'big' games, Mancini's primary aim in the first half is always to prevent the opposition from scoring. I've seen it several times. Utd (H), Arsenal (A), and a few other games, all followed a similar pattern. We shut down their attack, wait for the opposition to feel some urgency, that they must score soon and thus the game opens up a little. Last season, he typically waited until 70-75 minutes before introducing a second CF/ swapping a midfielder for an attacking midfielder.

This time, the added flexibility of our midfielders came to the fore. Yaya pushed well forward at half time, providing support for Tevez, and much, much more. I think the key yesterday was; Yaya is much more suited to the Lampard role than Essien is.

Essien is a decent passer but lacks vision. He has the pace to drive forward but not the ability to dribble in the tight areas. He tends to shoot from distance instead. Yesterday showed, he tends to miss.

By way of contrast, Yaya picked out a few great passes, and executed one very dangerous dribble. He has vision, skill, and the feel for attacking play.

The rest of what we saw was, in my opinion, a vindication for Mancini sticking to his gameplan in the absence of his attacking fullbacks. The GK, CB's, and DM's, were playing the exact same roles they have played all season, and the exact same roles they will play until the end of the season. When more emphasis on attack is needed, we can already get quite a bit more from the same players, as demonstrated by Yaya's flexibility... further to that, we change the players around this 'back 7', at a pinch, we sacrifice one of Barry/NDJ/Toure, for Milner, Silva, SWP, AJ. Ultimately, I believe we will see Balo up with Tevez, with Silva in the hole (Balo cutting in from the left, Silva from the right)....But the basic structure will not change.

---------Hart
----Toure---Kompany
---------NDJ
----Toure---Barry

Is firmly established as the backbone of our team. They showed yesterday that they can out play, and out tackle what is usually considered the biggest, 'strongest' midfield around. They know their roles perfectly, enjoy playing with each other, and believe in each other.

Would they have reached that level yesterday if we'd been messing around with 4-4-2 and all the different organisation that entails?


The last thing I wanted to mention was how much our goal reminded me of Nik's illustration of the defensive organisation of a team in 'full attack' mode. A CB and SB are left behind two DM's. What happened was: City clear. Tevez, in yet another example of his super-human capabilities for hard work and running, forced a weak header, which reached a DM, who was caught two on one by our two players. One comes away with the ball... Tev and Silva sprint forward, recieve the ball... and it's two on two.... a CB and SB. The pundits noted that Cole turned his back on the ball, that he was responsible for holding Tevez up.... He failed, and the goal reminded me of nothing more than Tevez turning Terry and stealing the goal at Stamford Bridge last year.

It also reminded me of the complete balls up in the England Germany game this summer... where, time after time, Barry was left as last man back because both CB's AND the fullbacks had pushed up for the corner. Capello is no mug, presumably he wanted them to use the 'orthodox' system with one CB and one SB covering.

IMO Gareth Barry was simply the fall guy, the fault lay with Terry, demonstrating once again his irresponsible attitude. Yes, he's a fist pumping, blood letting inspiration... but give me a Kompany man, any day of the week. Someone you can rely on.

I woke up this morning think I fancied making an analysis of the Chelsea match - then I read your post ;)
Basically you're bang on the money, couldn't agree more.
Special credit goes for highlighting the defensive rectangle of VK - KT - De Jong - Barry and Yaya. Excellent work bud. I've never thought of it as clearly as you but I can see now in retrospect this is probably the single most important feature of what Mancini is trying to do. Just well done for spotting it and formulating it so clearly.
That rectangle will always be present and will always be able to soak up pressure, put pressure on opposition midfield and retain the ball.
It's almost as if the full backs, wingers and strikers are secondary to it, they work around it. You could chop and change what's around it as you know you can depend on the rectangle to keep the shape and style of play we want!

Without exaggerating - I think we should discuss this some more. As I said, it believe it's vitally important in Mancini's tactics.

Kompany: The steady rock.
K Toure: More mobile covering CB.
De Jong: The "sweeper" that breaks up opposition play and covers the back four.
Garry: Ball-winning, dependable midfielder.
Y. Toure: The dynamic all-around midfielder.

See how Kompany/Barry and the Toure brothers almost "mirrors" each other?
De Jong is the vital link, the glue between them, the safety net.
I find this quite fascinating to be honest!

 

[Didsbury Dave]

Time for an update, here's my fivepenneth...

Yesterday was an interesting game for many reasons.

High profile games often are tight and extremely tactical. They are also subject to closer tactical analysis by the media. Chelsea's formation is familiar to the pundits. The two managers being former adversaries, and the stereotypical view of the Italian as 'tactician', only added to the interest. So it's no surprise that much of the credit for the win was laid upon the manager, even at the expense of the players, some of whom delivered really outstanding displays. Even VK, who excelled in every regard, talked as if City 'having a plan' was the crucial factor. Or, maybe that's just the way his comments were edited... either way, you get the point. Mancini must feel pretty satisfied this morning.

It provided examples of a few things we've talked about in this thread:

1) 'Weak' flanks vs 'Strong' flanks.

Look at that diagram, is it any wonder that City's better attacks came down the left hand side? Milner, Tevez, Silva and Zabaleta targeted Ivanovich. This is because there is a huge gap between him, and his team mate on the right, Anelka. There is also no obvious midfielder assigned to help him out. Mikkel is covering the CB's. Ramires is on the left *which surprises me*, and Essien was asked to play a Lampard esq attacking role... that's something I'll come back to.

In the first half, city lined up with Yaya stayed deep inside the midfield, with Silva on the right. Neither had eye catching halves. Yet they did a good job, because Silva's presence prevented Cole from attacking, Yaya's towering strength contributed to crushing Ramires's confidence. Their presence also contributed to preventing Malouda from isolating Boyata. Boyata was extremely well supported by Kolo Toure, who was freed up to help him by NDJ, who was freed up by Yaya.... the 20 year old played with grit and confidence and delivered several tough challenges.

2) 'Phases' and adaptability.

I believe, in these 'big' games, Mancini's primary aim in the first half is always to prevent the opposition from scoring. I've seen it several times. Utd (H), Arsenal (A), and a few other games, all followed a similar pattern. We shut down their attack, wait for the opposition to feel some urgency, that they must score soon and thus the game opens up a little. Last season, he typically waited until 70-75 minutes before introducing a second CF/ swapping a midfielder for an attacking midfielder.

This time, the added flexibility of our midfielders came to the fore. Yaya pushed well forward at half time, providing support for Tevez, and much, much more. I think the key yesterday was; Yaya is much more suited to the Lampard role than Essien is.

Essien is a decent passer but lacks vision. He has the pace to drive forward but not the ability to dribble in the tight areas. He tends to shoot from distance instead. Yesterday showed, he tends to miss.

By way of contrast, Yaya picked out a few great passes, and executed one very dangerous dribble. He has vision, skill, and the feel for attacking play.

The rest of what we saw was, in my opinion, a vindication for Mancini sticking to his gameplan in the absence of his attacking fullbacks. The GK, CB's, and DM's, were playing the exact same roles they have played all season, and the exact same roles they will play until the end of the season. When more emphasis on attack is needed, we can already get quite a bit more from the same players, as demonstrated by Yaya's flexibility... further to that, we change the players around this 'back 7', at a pinch, we sacrifice one of Barry/NDJ/Toure, for Milner, Silva, SWP, AJ. Ultimately, I believe we will see Balo up with Tevez, with Silva in the hole (Balo cutting in from the left, Silva from the right)....But the basic structure will not change.

---------Hart
----Toure---Kompany
---------NDJ
----Toure---Barry

Is firmly established as the backbone of our team. They showed yesterday that they can out play, and out tackle what is usually considered the biggest, 'strongest' midfield around. They know their roles perfectly, enjoy playing with each other, and believe in each other.

Would they have reached that level yesterday if we'd been messing around with 4-4-2 and all the different organisation that entails?


The last thing I wanted to mention was how much our goal reminded me of Nik's illustration of the defensive organisation of a team in 'full attack' mode. A CB and SB are left behind two DM's. What happened was: City clear. Tevez, in yet another example of his super-human capabilities for hard work and running, forced a weak header, which reached a DM, who was caught two on one by our two players. One comes away with the ball... Tev and Silva sprint forward, recieve the ball... and it's two on two.... a CB and SB. The pundits noted that Cole turned his back on the ball, that he was responsible for holding Tevez up.... He failed, and the goal reminded me of nothing more than Tevez turning Terry and stealing the goal at Stamford Bridge last year.

It also reminded me of the complete balls up in the England Germany game this summer... where, time after time, Barry was left as last man back because both CB's AND the fullbacks had pushed up for the corner. Capello is no mug, presumably he wanted them to use the 'orthodox' system with one CB and one SB covering.

IMO Gareth Barry was simply the fall guy, the fault lay with Terry, demonstrating once again his irresponsible attitude. Yes, he's a fist pumping, blood letting inspiration... but give me a Kompany man, any day of the week. Someone you can rely on.

Very good post.

The only thing I would perhaps take issue with was using Milner as the attacking outlet on the left. He regulalry got into good positions but only put one good ball in, which Tevez nearly got to, first half. His lack of pace is a problem out there.

However, it was he who won the ball for the goal, and he tucked in well when defending, so ultimately you have to say it worked.

 

[jimbo101]

Any volunteers to update this with the Arsenal game?

This is one of the few threads that doesn't get contaminated with the usual knee jerk 'he's shit - get rid' type comments.

I've missed it, but didn't get to the Arsenal game so can't update.

Cheers

 

[Didsbury Dave]

Any volunteers to update this with the Arsenal game?

This is one of the few threads that doesn't get contaminated with the usual knee jerk 'he's shit - get rid' type comments.

I've missed it, but didn't get to the Arsenal game so can't update.

Cheers

I haven't got time to go into that sort of detail.

For the first 5 minutes it wasn't actually the 4-2-3-1 which we have been playing. It was more of a standard 4-3-3 with De Jong deep.

But then with 10 men we essentially played 4-3-1-1 with Silva the link between the forward and defence. Ya Ya went to centre half at first, then came back into midfield and Barry went left back and Boateng centre half.

Second half Bridge went left back, Barry back to midfield.

 

[Keith Moon]

<a class="postlink" href="http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/10/24/manchester-city-0-3-arsenal-tactics/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;">http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/10/24/ ... l-tactics/</a>

 

[jimbo101]

Zonal marking is an excellent site with tactical, impartial reports & analysis.

however, they don't cover every game (but did do sundays)

 

[1.618034]

Good article in The Grauniad...

And Kevin Keegan and Antoine Sibierski even get a mention!?

<a class="postlink" href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/blog/2010/oct/26/the-question-barcelona-reinventing-w-w" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;">http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/blog/20 ... enting-w-w</a>

The Question: Are Barcelona reinventing the W-W formation?

To counter teams who sit deep, Barça push both full-backs up the pitch – echoing the 2-3-2-3 formation of the 1930s

Football is a holistic game. Advance a player here and you must retreat a player there. Give one player more attacking responsibility and you must give another increased defensive duties. As three at the back has become outmoded as a balanced or attacking formation – though not as a defensive formation – by the boom in lone-striker systems, coaches have had to address the problem of how to incorporate attacking full-backs without the loss of defensive cover.

For clubs who use inverted wingers, as Barcelona do, the issue is particularly significant. For them, the attacking full-back provides not merely auxiliary attacking width but is the basic source of width as the wide forwards turn infield. The absence of an Argentinian Dani Alves figure in part explains why Lionel Messi has been less successful at national level than at club level. For Barcelona, as he turns inside off the right flank, Alves streaks outside him, and the opposing full-back cannot simply step inside and force Messi to try to use his weaker right foot. Do that, and Messi nudges it on to Alves. So the full-back tries to cover both options, and Messi then has time and space to inflict damage with his left foot.

It is the same if Pedro plays on the right flank, and the same when David Villa plays on the left. Barcelona's wide forwards are always looking to cut inside to exploit the space available on the diagonal, and that is facilitated if they have overlapping full-backs. Traditionally, if one full-back pushed forwards the other would sit, shuffling across to leave what was effectively a back three.

Barcelona, though, often have both full-backs pushed high, a risky strategy necessitated by how frequently they come up against sides who sit deep against them. With width on both sides they can switch the play quickly from one flank to the other, and turn even a massed defence. They still, though, need cover in case the opponent breaks, and so Sergio Busquets sits in, becoming in effect a third centre-back.

That, of course, is not especially new. Most sides who have used a diamond in midfield have done something similar. At Shakhtar Donetsk, before they switched to a 4-2-3-1, Dario Srna and Razvan Rat were liberated by Mariusz Lewandowski dropping very deep in midfield. At Chelsea, Luiz Felipe Scolari would often, when sketching out his team shape, include Mikel John Obi as a third centre-back. And Barcelona themselves had Yaya Touré dropping back to play as a centre-back on their run to the Champions League trophy in 2008-09.

What is different is the degree. It is not just Barcelona. I first became aware of the trend watching Mexico play England in a pre-World Cup friendly. Trying to note down the Mexican formation, I had them as four at the back, then three, then four, then three, and I realised it was neither and both, switching from 4-3-3 to 3-4-3, as it did during the World Cup.

Ricardo Osorio and Francisco Rodríguez sat deep as the two centre-backs, with Rafael Márquez operating almost as an old-fashioned (by which I mean pre-second world war) centre-half just in front of them. Paul Aguilar and Carlos Salcido were attacking full-backs, so the defence was effectively split into two lines, a two and a three. Efraín Juárez and Gerardo Torrado sat in central midfield, behind a front three of Giovani dos Santos, Guillermo Franco and Carlos Vela. The most accurate way of denoting the formation, in fact, would be 2-3-2-3: the shape, in other words, was the W-W with which Vittorio Pozzo's Italy won the World Cup in 1934 and 1938.

Of the same species as Pozzo

Pozzo first latched on to football while studying the manufacture of wool in Bradford in the first decade of the last century. He would travel all around Yorkshire and Lancashire watching games, eventually becoming a fan of Manchester United and, in particular, their fabled half-back line of Dick Duckworth, Charlie Roberts and Alec Bell. All centre-halves, he thought, should be like Roberts, capable of long, sweeping passes out to the wings. It was a belief he held fundamental and led to his decision, having been reappointed manager of the Italy national team in 1924, immediately to drop Fulvio Bernardini, an idol of the Roman crowds, because he was a 'carrier' rather than a 'dispatcher'.

As a result, Pozzo abhorred the W-M formation that his friend Herbert Chapman, the manager of Arsenal, developed after the change in the offside law in 1925, in which the centre-half – in Arsenal's case Herbie Roberts – became a stopper, an 'overcoat' for the opposing centre-forward. He did, though, recognise that in the new reality the centre-half had to take on some defensive responsibilities.

Pozzo found the perfect player for the role in Luisito Monti. He had played for Argentina in the 1930 World Cup but, after joining Juventus in 1931, became one of the oriundi – those South American players who, thanks to Italian heritage, qualified to play for their adopted country. Already 30 when he signed, Monti was overweight and, even after a month of solitary training, was not quick. He was, though, fit and became known as Doble ancho (Double wide) for his capacity to cover the ground.

Monti became a centro mediano (halfway house) – not quite Charlie Roberts but not Herbie Roberts either. He would drop when the other team had possession and mark the opposing centre-forward, but would advance and become an attacking fulcrum when his side had the ball. Although he was not a third back, he played deeper than a traditional centre-half and so the two inside-forwards retreated to support the wing-halves. Italy's shape became a 2-3-2-3, the W-W. At the time it seemed, as the journalist Mario Zappa put it in La Gazzetta della Sport, "a model of play that is the synthesis of the best elements of all the most admired systems", something borne out by Italy's success.

Footfalls echo in the memory

To acknowledge that modern football's shape at times resembles the 1930s, though, is not to repeat Qohelet, the author of Ecclesiastes, and lament the futility of a world without novelty: "What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun. Is there anything of which one can say, 'Look! This is something new'? It was here already, long ago; it was here before our time." Nor is it to argue that tactics are somehow cyclical, as many bewilderingly do.

Rather it is to acknowledge that fragments and echoes of the past still flicker, reinvented and reinterpreted for the modern age. Like Mexico, Barcelona's shape, at least when they use only one midfield holder, seems to ape that of Pozzo's Italy. Those who defend three at the back argue that, to prevent the side having two spare men when facing a single-striker system, one of the centre-backs can step into midfield, to which the response is few defenders are good enough technically to do that, and why not just field an additional midfielder anyway? What Barcelona and Mexico have done is approach the problem the opposite way round, using a holding midfielder as an additional centre-back rather than a centre-back as an additional midfielder.

But the style of football is very different. It is not just that modern football is far quicker than that of the 30s. Barcelona press relentlessly when out of possession, a means of defending that was not developed until a quarter of a century after Pozzo's second World Cup. In the opening 20 minutes at the Emirates last season when Barcelona overwhelmed Arsenal, the major difference between the sides lay not in technique but in the discipline of their pressing.

Inverted wingers, similarly, would have been alien to Pozzo: Enrique Guaita and Raimundo Orsi started wide and stayed wide, looking to reach the byline and sling crosses in. Angelo Schiavio was a fixed point as a centre-forward – no dropping deep or pulling wide for him. The two wing-halves, Attilio Ferraris and Luigi Bertolini, would have been too concerned with negating the opposing inside-forwards to press forward and overlap.

Nonetheless, the advantages of the W-W for a side that want to retain possession, the interlocking triangles offering simple passing options, remain the same. Having Busquets, the modern-day Monti, drop between Carles Puyol and Gerard Piqué is not just a defensive move; it also makes it easier for Barcelona to build from the back. Against a 4-4-2 or a 4-2-3-1, Busquets can be picked up by a deeper-lying centre-forward or the central player in the trident, which can interrupt Barcelona's rhythm (just as sides realised after Kevin Keegan had deployed Antoine Sibierski to do the job, that – counterintuitively – Chelsea could be upset by marking Claude Makélelé); pull Busquets deeper, though, and he has more space to initiate attacks.

There is a wider point here, which relates to notation. Looking at reports from the early 70s, it seems bizarre to modern eyes that teams were still listed as though they played a 2-3-5, which had been dead for the best part of 70 years. Yet that, presumably, was still how journalists and their readers thought. Future generations may equally look at our way of recording formations and wonder how we ever thought it logical that a team playing "a back four" could feature fewer defensive players than a team playing "a back three".

We understand that full-backs attack and that in a back four the two centre-backs will almost invariably play deeper than their full-backs, but the formation as we note it does not record that. Barcelona tend to play a 4-1-2-3 or a 4-2-1-3, according to our system of notation; heat maps of average position, though, show it as a 2-3-2-3. Barcelona, like Mexico, play a W-W, but not as Pozzo knew it.

Perhaps when we get Kolarov and Boateng properly fit we might see Mancini doing something similar?

------------Hart-----------

--------Kolo---Kompany-----

Boateng---NDJ/Yaya---Kolarov

-------Milner-----Barry------

--Johnson----Tevez----Silva---


It's not a million miles away from the current 4-3-3 really and like the article says, formations don't always replicate the "heat maps of average position" anyway. But I think it might be what we're working towards..?

 

[mcfcliam]

Before the sending off..

After the sending off..

Such a lack of width...we could really hurt teams on the wings.